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Abstract 
This thesis is an exploration of the writings of the 20th century German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger to understand what thinking is and how thinking 
needs to be undertaken I examine Heidegger s commitments to phenomenology in his
early writings, his revaluation of the meaning of truth in traditional Western 
metaphysics, his criticism of calculative thinking and scientific rationality, his diagnosis 
of the human alienation and homelessness, and his evocation of the redemptive power 
of art and poetry through which we can find our place in the world. By questioning 
through all these themes, I attempt to trace Heidegger s path towards a deeper and a 
more original kind of thinking that remains largely ignored in traditional philosophical 
inquiry.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Marin Heidegger delivered a number of lectures to his students in the summer 
and winter semesters of 1951 and 1952 at the University of Freiburg. The lectures were 
compiled into a volume titled What is Called Thinking? In it, Heidegger makes a peculiar 
statement: Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not 
thinking.1 What does he mean by we are still not thinking It sounds completely 
counterintuitive, especially because that decade saw a great many advances in thinking. 
For example, that very same year, the structure of the DNA molecule, which contained 
the genetic information of how organisms survive, grow, and reproduce, was 
discovered. Two years before, in 1950, Bertrand Russell was awarded the Nobel Prize 
for his great legacy in philosophy and his social activism. In 1957, the Soviet Union 
launched a first artificial satellite Sputnik 1 into Earth s orbit; and in a little more than a 
decade later, in 1969, Americans landed on the moon. In the same decade, we saw great 
works such as Samuel Beckett s Waiting for Godot J D Salinger s The Catcher in the Rye, 
Elie Wiesel s Night, and many more. All of them are products of thinking. So, when 
Heidegger says that we are still not thinking who is the we that he is talking
about? Do the people that I listed above count as ones who were still not thinking
 
1 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper 
& Row Publishers, 1968), p. 6. 
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Does his assessment apply to 1950? More interesting is the question: does it apply 
seventy years later in 2020?  
Moreover, why is the mid-20th century a thought provoking time for
Heidegger? Could it be said that early 21st century is also thought-provoking? If so, the 
same could certainly be said about every decade, every year, and every moment in 
history. But if every moment in history has been thought-provoking and we have never 
been thinking in the way Heidegger qualifies as thinking then Heidegger statement
becomes an empty riddle purported to shock the reader rather than actually describe 
the state of affairs. This might be true. Nonetheless, he is making that statement 
carefully and deliberately. I do not think that he is saying that we are not thinking at all 
nor that we are no longer thinking. It is implicit in the statement that if something is 
thought-provoking or provokes our thought it means that thinking must already be 
underway. Nothing would be thought-provoking if we were already not capable of 
thinking.  Just as nothing would be sightworthy if we were already not capable of 
seeing. Therefore, Heidegger does believe that we are capable of thinking and we have 
been thinking, but we have not been doing it in the right way. Then the question 
remains: what does it mean to think, according to Heidegger?  
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The most direct hint is given in his essay The Question Concerning 
Technology  where he says Questioning is the piety of thought 2 How we ask 
questions determines how we think; and if we cannot ask questions, we cannot think. 
The institutions of science, economics, politics, psychology, sociology, etc. all ask 
questions and have been be asking questions for generations, and thus, have thought 
throughout. But for Heidegger, the thinking that has prevailed in all of those 
disciplines, as well as in philosophy, has been led astray; thinking has forgotten its way 
along with its beginnings. My thesis is an attempt to understand why Heidegger thinks 
so and why this question of thinking applies to this decade just as it did to the previous 
ones. For this I will focus mostly on Heidegger s later writings as well as this some of
his early ones such as his seminal Being and Time, where he anticipates some of the 
thinking that becomes explicit in his later writings. 
In Chapter 1 I will explore Heidegger s early philosophy commitment to truth
as unconcealment as opposed to truth as correctness, the way of being in the world 
through understanding and interpreting that he sketches out in Being and Time, and the 
different levels in which we are involved in language, namely the hermeneutic logos and 
the apophantic logos. In Chapter 2, I will address his criticism of the view of nature 
defined by traditional metaphysics, his conjecture that science is inherently 
 
2 Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology  in The Question Concerning Technology, and Other 
Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 35. 
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representational  and grounded in calculative objectivity, and his evaluation of the 
essence of technology. In Chapter 3, I will explore why he thinks metaphysical thinking, 
which gives rise to science, overlooks the fundamental relationship between humans 
and the world. That relationship is undermined by objectification and a calculative 
understanding of things in the world, and thus makes us alienated from our origins and 
leaves us homeless. But our sense of place can be reclaimed by what Heidegger calls 
meditative or contemplative thinking In Chapter 4, I examine Heidegger s attempt
to reestablish our sense of place in the world by thinking poetically. Ultimately, this 
thesis is my attempt to understand Heidegger s path towards thinking and also to give
an answer to the question: how should we think? 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: The Grounding of Heidegger s Early Philosophy 
1. Truth and the Phenomenological Method 
  What do we mean when we talk about truth Is it about whether a proposition 
is true or false? For Heidegger, we cannot ponder this question objectively for we do not 
have an objective and detached relationship with the world. But what about scientific 
objectivity? Does Heidegger believe that there can be no scientific truths? Not quite. 
Heidegger thinks that the abstractions in scientific objectivity skip over our more 
original and ordinary subjective relationship to the world that any assertion of 
objectivity presupposes a subjectivity. Still, the kind of talk that relies on the subject-
object distinction comes with a historical background that purposefully categorizes 
human beings as subjects and things in the world as objects. Thus, it separates lived 
experience into a two-fold artificial abstraction, which is why the question of truth is 
not adequately expressed in the metaphysical traditions of the West. Heidegger says, 
Philosophy must perhaps start from the subject and return to the subject in its
ultimate questions and yet for all that it may not pose its questions in a one-sidedly 
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subjectivistic manner 1 He was suspicious of the subjectivistic philosophies that put the 
ego-subject on the pedestal of knowledge and consciousness. Even his mentor Edmund 
Husserl, in developing the phenomenology that Heidegger champions, gave an 
overemphasis on consciousness and ego-subject [which] were signs that Husserl 
remained with the Cartesians 2 For Heidegger, we are not first of all beings (as 
subjects) prior to the world (of objects). We are not distanced beings looking out into the 
world but we are already in it, feeling, breathing, walking, etc.; we are worldly 
creatures.3 This worldliness must come forth by pondering the meaning of Da-sein, 
which for Heidegger is the essential mode of our existence. Dasein [Da in German is 
there and sein is being defies the metaphysical abstraction of the world as a
detached subject and acknowledges the always already being-there of existence. In this 
way, the question of truth arrives at the question of ontology, our relationship to the 
world as existing beings, and these questions need to be approached in the right way
through being grounded in a phenomenological framework.  
 
1  Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1982), p. 155. 
2 Michael E. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self The Developments of Heidegger s Concept of Authenticit  Revised 
Edition. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1986, p. 23; also cf. Heidegger in Basic Problems p 125 Husserl
refers constantly to this distinction, and precisely in the form in which Descartes expressed it: res 
cogitans res extensa.  
3 Cf. Karsten Harries: The difficulty with talk about subject and object is that it tends to take the self out of 
the world, placing it before the world as a spectator stands before a picture in which he has no place (in 
"Fundamental Ontology" in Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy [New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1978], p. 88). 
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At its root, a phenomenon is a showing-itself-in-itself [that] signifies a distinctive 
way in which something can be encountered. 4 It is a subjective mode of experiencing 
entities in the world through attending to how they reveal themselves to us. For 
instance, the feeling of melancholy about a profound loss shows itself the way it is as an 
experienced phenomenon within ourselves. It is not experienced as a mere 
neurochemical process within our body. Phenomenon is to be distinguished from 
appearance, which does not mean showing-itself; it means rather the announcing itself 
by something which doesn t show itself but which announces itself through something
which does show itself 5 Appearance is a distancing of the experiencing subject from a 
more primordial way of encountering the world. When the human being becomes a 
detached subject, then the world appears; we are not in the world but outside of it.  
 The question of truth can be approached phenomenologically once we attend to 
how truth shows itself and gets encountered by subjects. For Heidegger, truth is not 
simply a thing that stands as a free-floating object that is to be grasped by knowing 
beings. The traditional definition of truth that starts with Plato has its bearings on the 
correctness true and false of the statements Plato says And those that say of the
things that are that they are, are true, while those that say of the things that are that they 
 
4 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Perennial 
Modern Classics, 2008), p. 54. 
5 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 52. 
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are not are false 6 A statement is true if it corresponds to the state of affairs that it is 
supposed to describe. With Aquinas there is more standard metaphysical definition of 
truth veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. This can be taken to mean: truth is the 
correspondence of the matter to knowledge 7 This version presides even in the modern 
tradition throughout Descartes and Russell.8 The statement A door is a rectangular
aperture is true because it correctly describes what we mean by the idea of a door; 
the statement is in accord with our knowledge of what a door is. This is truth as 
correctness (Richtigkeit), a truth that makes a naive assumption that things are just 
there waiting to be discovered The untruth of the proposition (incorrectness) is the 
nonaccordance of the statement with the matter 9 The statement A door is a wall is
untrue because it is not in accord with the matter of what a door is Truth here is a
relation of agreement 10 The agreement of something with something has the formal
 
6 Plato, Cratylus in The Complete Works of Plato, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 385b2, p. 105; cf. his statement in Sophist 263b p 287 And the
true one says those that are as they are about you And the false one says things different from those that 
are. Aristotle also has a similar formulation in his Metaphysics, Book Gamma Well falsity is the
assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is and truth is the assertion that that which is is 
and that that which is not is not Aristotle Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred. London: Penguin 
Books, 1998, p. 107). 
7 Martin Heidegger On the Essence of Truth in Pathmarks, ed. by William H. McNeill (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 138. 
8 Rene Descartes Letter to Mersenne 16 October 1639 in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3, 
Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1991 pp 139 I have never had any doubts about truth
because it seems a notion so transcendentally clear that nobody can be ignorant of it that the word
truth in the strict sense denotes the conformity of thought with its object and Bertrand Russell
Problems of Philosophy Oxford Oxford University Press 2001 p 75 Thus a belief is true when there is a
corresponding fact and is false when there is no corresponding fact  
9 Heidegger On the Essence of Truth p 139  
10 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 258. 
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character of a relation of something to something. Every agreement, and therefore 
truth as well is a relation 11 But what lets this relation be in the first place?  
 Heidegger thinks that there needs to be something more primordial that lets this 
relational truth, that distinguishes truth and falsity in a proposition, exist. It is a process 
of revealing that needs to be encountered. The proposition is not the place where truth
first becomes possible but the reverse The proposition is possible only within truth 12 
Heidegger calls this truth that makes the propositional truth possible unconcealment 
(Unverborgenheit); unconcealment is the ontological condition of truth conventionally
understood that is as correctness or correspondence with entities 13 Heidegger uses 
the terms unconcealment and truth Wahrheit) interchangeably in his early writings, 
but in his 1929 essay On the Essence of Truth he prefers to use the Greek term aletheia 
instead of truth in much of his later writings truth is reserved for the traditional 
notion of correctness, and Dasein's disclosedness and discursive articulation of beings 
are no longer considered to be true but rather ground the possibility of the truth and
falsity of assertions or representations 14 He says, to translate this word aletheia] as 
 
11 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 258. 
12 Martin Heidegger, Logic: The Question of Truth, trans. Thomas Sheehan (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2010), p. 113. 
13 Taylor Carman, Heidegger s Anal tic Interpretation Discourse and Authenticit in Being and Time (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 259. 
14 Gary Steiner, "Heidegger's Reflection of Aletheia" in Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 13, No.1, 
Winter 1986, pp. 38-50.  
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truth is to cover up the meaning of what the Greeks made self-evidently basic for
the terminological use of aletheia as a pre-philosophical way of understanding it 15 
Aletheia or unconcealment is the more primary form of disclosure of any truth of
propositions, and it gives rise to the directive to rethink the ordinary concept of truth
in the sense of the correctness of statements and to think it back to that still 
uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings 16 In this formulation truth
is what gets un-concealed or disclosed and untruth is what gets concealed or covered-
over. The hiddenness of things in the world is more primary than the unhiddenness for 
beings. Heidegger says the concealment of beings as a whole, untruth-proper, is older 
than every opened-ness of this or that being 17 For there to be any truth there needs to 
be the untruth of things that are not opened up yet. A grasping of truth from one 
perspective simultaneously keeps other truths hidden.18 Because we are finite beings 
there cannot be a total unconcealment and no philosophical questioning can lead to a 
transcendent knowledge. Yet, the more rigorous the questioning is, the more the 
 
15 Heidegger, Being and Time p 262 also cf Heidegger s remark in The End of Philosophy and the Task
of Thinking t o raise the question of aletheia, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the 
question of truth. For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to call aletheia in the sense of opening, 
truth in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh. [New York: Harper & Row, 1972], p. 70); also his 
essay Hegel and the Greeks if the essence of truth that straightaway comes to reign as correctness and
certainty can subsist only within the realm of unconcealment, then truth indeed has to do with Aletheia, 
but not Aletheia with truth in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998], p. 334). 
16 Heidegger On the Essence of Truth p 144  
17 Ibid., p. 148. 
18 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good & Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Vintage, 1989), where he bluntly rejects the idea of an objective standpoint towards the 
knowledge of truths and affirms that truth is always limited by a certain perspective.  
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unconcealment will let truth unfold. Ernst Tugendhat criticized Heidegger s use of 
unconcealment in talking about truth saying if one limits oneself to the two 
concepts un-concealment and concealment, there remains absolutely no possibility of 
determining the specific sense of falsehood, and therefore also of truth 19 However, 
Heidegger did not mean to supplant the idea of propositional truth that deals with the 
true and false the assertions with the idea of truth as unconcealment, but simply to 
inform that this underlying unconcealment or aletheia, is what allows propositional truth 
to take shape.20 In the following remarks, I will discuss how the idea of truth as 
unconcealment comes to fore by exploring Heidegger s concepts of understanding
interpretation and discourse to arrive at his description of logos, the sense-making 
of the world around us through language. 
2. Understanding and Interpretation 
 A. Understanding 
 Heidegger says the act of making-sense or understanding is directed primarily 
not to individual things and to general concepts Instead it is alive in one s first hand 
 
19 Ernst Tugendhat Heidegger s Idea of Truth in Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments Volume 3. 
Christopher Macann (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 85. 
20 For a more detailed view on this phenomenon of unconcealment, see Mark Wrathall, Unconcealment
in A Companion to Heidegger, Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (eds.) (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd., 2005); Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Heidegger s Concept of Truth (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); Gary Steiner, "Heidegger's Reflection of Aletheia" in Auslegung: A Journal of 
Philosophy, Volume 13, No.1, Winter 1986, pp. 38-50. 
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lived world and in one s world as a whole In this act of sense-making, the world is 
opened up for existence 21 Understanding is not first of all theoretical or an alien
entity with which we make sense of the world. It is an activity that is lived and
encountered in the world that subjects find themselves in. It is taking hold of the world 
as it comes to the immediate experience of practical life and understanding ourselves
and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of 22 
Understanding is the way we make sense of entities by dealing with things available
for use in everyday practical activity. Understanding means knowing how, and it 
precedes and makes possible cognition, or knowing that. 23 It is the way we interact with 
entities in the world. The ordinary objects in the world are not simply substances with 
properties, and we do not encounter them in the way that the traditional ontology 
might suggest.  The fundamental ontology proposed by Heidegger attempts to 
overcome this deficiency by giving more careful attention to the many different modes
in which man exists and encounters things. Its goal is the exhibition of the structures 
constitutive of human being (Dasein 24 We do not simply perceive the world around 
us; as Heidegger says No matter how sharply we just look at the outward
appearance of things in whatever form this takes we cannot discover anything
 
21 Heidegger, Logic, p. 126. 
22 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I. 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 61. 
23 Carman, Heidegger s Anal tic, p. 207. 
24 Harries Fundamental Ontology p 67  
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available 25 Our access to the world is not granted by staring at it but by being involved 
with it practically. 
A hammer is not simply an object of perception with properties of hardness and 
rigidity. It is something to hit with, maybe to flatten a surface or to thrust a nail; it is a 
piece of equipment (Zeug in a broad enough sense to include whatever is useful: tools, 
materials toys clothing dwellings etc 26 Equipmentality is the most basic way of 
being involved with the world and understanding our context of existence in the web of 
meanings relating to the equipment.27 Equipment is in order to 28 It is directed 
towards accomplishing something; it is directed towards the future. The use of a plow is 
what gives the farmer a context to his mode of being in the world and accomplishing 
the task of harvesting crops and sustaining his livelihood. Equipment is something 
available to use or ready-to-hand zuhanden) and not something theoretical that is 
potentially available to use or present-at-hand vorhanden). When one makes sense of 
the hammer one sees the hammer as an object ready-to-hand. Carman adds even less
is a human being a mere object with mental properties added on, but a doer and a 
 
25 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 98. 
26 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p. 62. 
27 This notion of equipment is related to his discussion of technology in his later writings, where the form 
of equipment takes a new essence with more technical involvement with things Harries says Heidegger
later came to see that technological equipment cannot be understood as just another, perhaps more 
complex, tool. With technology the ontology of objectivity, which, on Heidegger's account, has to uproot 
and dislocate the individual has entered everyday existence Fundamental Ontology p 73 emphasis
added). 
28 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 292. 
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sufferer, an agent and a patient, not a what but a who, not something with extra 
psychological features in addition but someone living a life, emerging from a history 
and plunging into a future 29 For Heidegger, thinking of entities and beings as objects 
with properties is an impoverished way of experiencing the richness of the boundless 
phenomena surrounding us. However, this way of thinking is very useful whenever we 
are devising scientific theories about the world or when treating someone for disease or 
when there is an equipmental failure. In all of these cases, the object necessarily has to 
be present-at-hand and is no longer accessible as ready-to-hand but only theoretically. 
In anything ready-to-hand the world is always already there 30 In anything present-
at-hand the world is there as a pure presence without any relation to beings and is not 
already there but needs to be processed theoretically to get hold of it. When nature, 
which stirs and strives which assails us and enthralls us as landscape is thought as
present-at-hand in the metaphysical tradition, it remains essentially hidden from 
beings. We lose touch with its phenomenon and its essence remains concealed.31 
 B. Interpretation 
When we engage with the world that is ready-to-hand by understanding it in
terms of a totality of involvements we can then interpret it more explicitly and find
 
29 Carman in Foreword to Being and Time, xv. 
30 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 114. 
31 I will discuss more about the conception of nature in traditional metaphysics in Chapter 2. 
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meaning.32 Heidegger says all interpretation is grounded on understanding That
which has been articulated as such an interpretation and sketched out beforehand and 
understanding in general as something articulable is the meaning 33 Interpretation 
[Auslegung] can occur only when there is already an understanding; and meaning 
emerges when interpretation, grounded in understanding, gets worked out or 
articulated. Only in interpretation can meaning become explicit and thematized in the 
present. It tries to make sense out of what was given in the past by our contingency or 
thrownness and what we seek to accomplish in the future as projected by our 
understanding. Interpretation is where choices are made on the basis of meanings that 
have previously been disclosed for us. As understanding takes hold of the past or the 
givenness of what was already there and seeks to actualize the possibilities in the 
future, interpretation grounds it in the present and makes sense of the possibilities of 
understanding. Interpretation does not change or skew the understanding but simply 
actualizes it in the present.  
Heidegger adds that which is disclosed in understanding that which is 
understood is already accessible in such a way that its as which can be made to stand
out explicitly The as makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is
understood It constitutes the interpretation 34 Interpretation has a structure of
 
32 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 191. 
33 Ibid., p. 195. 
34 Ibid., p. 189. 
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something as something. 35 But it is not a representation of the thing out there, waiting to be 
discovered and decoded Because understanding itself isn t always explicit and
thematic, the interpretation has to present it as something that is explicit In
interpreting we do not throw a signification over some naked thing which is present-
at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is 
encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is 
disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets 
laid out by interpretation 36 By the time we encounter the world, things are already 
suffused with values and nothing is neutral. In interpreting the world, we process those 
values surrounding us and attribute them to the things as they show themselves to us, 
as our Dasein sees them. Understanding provides context to interpretation.37 If someone 
understands the hammer as something to hit a nail, then they can interpret the hammer 
in its different possibilities namely, hitting a nail on a wall to put up a picture or to fix 
a broken cupboard, or to build a new doghouse, etc. But if someone understands it 
merely as something that is heavy and rigid and uses it as a paperweight or as a 
decoration in an aquarium, then they are simply thematizing it as a present-at-hand 
object that has no essential relationship to the lived world. Yet, this is not to say that the 
 
35 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 189. 
36 Ibid., p. 190-1. 
37 See Carman, Heidegger s Anal tic p 210 If understanding is knowing how, interpretation must be a 
kind of showing how.  
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present-at-hand properties of the hammer are irrelevant its objective weight and
form can inform us about how to use it in different contexts. There is a place for 
scientific objectivity but the problem is only when that objectivity takes precedence over 
our thinking about our more essential involvement with the world.38 
3. Discourse and Logos 
 Even though interpretation is how understanding becomes explicit, that 
explicitness can be shown and communicated only through language. Heidegger holds 
that only because and insofar as things are revealed practically can they be revealed
linguistically. Practical truth is a necessary condition for semantic truth, but not vice 
versa 39 Practical involvement precedes all linguistic articulation, but this is not to be 
misconstrued with the empiricist position where sense experience is theorized into 
linguistic abstractions; the empiricist still believed in objective sense perceptions that 
can be translated into concepts.40 Moreover, the conception of language in the 
 
38 Dreyfus says In the natural sciences shared scientific background skills are necessary for deworlding 
nature and for testing theories, but these skills do not determine what is to count as the objects of the 
theory The scientists background skills function precisely to free the science s objects from dependence
on all practices, including the practices that reveal them They thus reveal incomprehensible nature
and deworlded relations between deworlded data  (Being-in-the-World, p. 207). 
39 Mark Okrent s remark quoted in Dahlstrom Heidegger s Concept of Truth p. 199. 
40 While empiricists such as Hume are right that one should not attempt to make assertions that go 
beyond the realm of experience, they are still misguided about how we encounter things. For Hume, 
things in the world are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each 
other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement Hume David A 
Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978], p. 252). The bundles of 
perceptions are objectified in the empiricist tradition, which is not what phenomenologists like Heidegger 
conform to. 
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structuralist tradition is not adequate in capturing the way Heidegger thinks of it. When 
Saussure says The linguistic sign unites not a thing and a name but a concept and a
sound-image 41 Dasein disappears; the connection, the link between language and the 
world becomes completely abstracted. Looking through language becomes nothing 
other than looking into the mirror; language becomes limited as self-consciousness. This 
thinking once again highlights the subjectivist approach that Heidegger is trying to 
move away from. To have language is to speak.42 It is to convey and point things out; it is 
an act, a doing. 
Heidegger uses the term discourse Rede) to describe this underlying 
meaningful act of communication that is underway in interpretation Discourse is the
Articulation of intelligibility. Discourse underlies interpretation and assertion. What can 
be articulated in interpretation, thus even more primordially in discourse, we have 
called meaning 43 The communicability of understanding is the basis for things to 
make sense and be intelligible. For meaning to arise, it cannot rest in understanding; it 
has to be articulated through the discursive mode. Discourse is the condition of 
interpretation, and of linguistic acts generally Each discourse all discursivity says
Heidegger has in itself the possibility of giving something meaningful, something that 
 
41 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), p. 66. 
42 Martin Heidegger Language in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: 
Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 188. 
43 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 205. 
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we understand indeed discourse and language constitutes precisely this dimension
of understandability, of mutual expression, requesting, desiring, asking, telling. 44 
Discourse in ordinary language facilitates a mutual understanding between different 
individuals. 
  For the ancient Greeks the word logos signified meaningful discourse
Heidegger says logos, as discourse means what we understand by language, yet it also 
means more than our vocabulary taken as a whole. It means the fundamental faculty of 
being able to talk discursively and accordingly to speak 45 Logos is a discursive 
language that make s manifest what one is talking about in one s discourse it lets
something be seen, namely, what the discourse is about 46 It is a vehicle for bringing 
things out of unconcealment, as it lets something be seen as something. It is not simply 
about producing sounds or symbols but rather as an engagement with things in a 
meaningful way. Heidegger, however, has a quite different approach to logos than the 
Greeks at its most fundamental level the hermeneutic level logos is a ready-to-hand 
articulation and sharing of meaning or significance, while [Heidegger] argues that the 
Greeks implicitly conceived the logos as a present-at-hand succession of words 47 Any 
kind of revealing happens in logos and in communicative language; without it things 
 
44 Martin Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill 
and Nicolas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 306. 
45 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 305. 
46 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 56. 
47 Steiner Heidegger s Reflection of Aletheia, p 43  
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remained hidden Those who are lacking in understanding are contrasted with the
logos, and also with him who speaks that logos and understands it But to those who
are lacking in understanding, what they do remains hidden lethein. They forget it; that 
is, for them it sinks back into hiddenness. Thus, to the logos belongs unhiddenness a-
lethein 48 Here one can once again see Heidegger s commitment to the idea of truth as
the phenomenon of unconcealment and untruth as that of concealment. The truth of 
logos brings entities to be encountered and uncovered in language; but untruth of logos 
covers it up by deception by putting something in front of something and thereby
passing it off as something which it is not. 49  
 Moreover, just as there are two distinct phenomena of sense-making, 
understanding and interpretation, logos also has two distinct structures that take part in 
unconcealment, namely the hermeneutic as  and the apophantic as.  The as is a relational
structure that cannot exist on its own and functions in a way that makes it possible to 
relate things in a meaningful way.50 The hermeneutic as  is the primary form of 
disclosure that has the fullness of meanings in the everyday practical context This as
is the structure of understanding. The understood is a hermeneia, that-which-is-
understood in an understanding and understanding is a basic comportment of 
 
48 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 262. 
49 Ibid., p. 57. 
50 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 288: Yet we immediately recognize that the 'as' 
signifies a 'relation' and that the 'as' is never given independently on its own. It points to something which 
stands in the 'as', and equally it points to some other thing, as which it is. 
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existence. Therefore, the structure of the as  is the fundamental hermeneutical structure 
of the being of that being which we call existence human life 51 This hermeneutic 
understanding is how we get acquainted to our own basic existence; our own ontology 
becomes accessible to us in the hermeneutic as . Things are experienced as ready-to-
hand in the totality of the context surrounding them So, a door is first understood as 
handy or as being used as an exit in the hermeneutic as  before one can make an 
assertion This door is an exit which employs the apophantic as. 52 This apophantic logos 
is fundamentally derivative of hermeneutic logos. 
The apophantic as  of assertion is essentially a pointing out of objects in the
world that have already been disclosed in context in the hermeneutic as.  It is letting 
what is at hand be seen as such in theory through a propositional statement 53 It brings 
things into view outside of their ordinary contexts as theoretical objects that are able to 
be grasped. Heidegger says The essence of a proposition is apophainestai showing a 
thing apo: in terms of itself. The meaning of an assertion as a form of speech is to show 
(deloun something as 54 In the proposition The door is an exit what gets shown is
the door as an exit a place that lets one leave the room But a door could also be
 
51 Heidegger, Logic, p. 127. The word hermeneia was first introduced to philosophy in Aristotle s work Peri 
Hermeneias (translated as De Interpretatione) where Aristotle gives logical forms of categorical 
propositions. The word also has its roots in Hermes the messenger god in Greek mythology who was 
responsible for mediating communication between gods and humans and revealing as well as concealing 
truths. 
52 Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Heidegger s Concept of Truth New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 191.  
53 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 319. 
54 Heidegger, Logic, p. 112. 
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something that lets one enter the room. But the statement lets us see the door as an 
exit only by narrowing down the field of meanings provided by the more primordial
hermeneutic involvement, which might be that the person uttering the proposition 
might be inside the room and not outside. It is the most explicit form of revealing, but it 
is limited in its scope Heidegger adds apophansis, the fundamental accomplishment of 
the logos, is a bringing into view of beings in how and what they are as beings 55 It 
points out beings in the world as they show themselves in understanding through 
assertions but it never brings us primarily and in general before those beings that are 
revealed. Rather the converse is the case: the blackboard must already have become 
manifest to us as such a being in order for us to assert something about it in pointing 
out 56 This way the interpretive hermeneutic as  precedes any sort of propositional 
understanding of the world and is grounded phenomenologically in discourse.  
The hermeneutic disclosure has a similar dimension to the unconcealment of 
truth as aletheia. The propositional truth as correctness is always already dependent on 
the more primary disclosure in the phenomenon of unconcealment. We first experience 
objects in the world as ready-to-hand involvement rather than as a present-at-hand 
abstractions. These commitments are central to Heidegger s understanding of our mode 
of being in the world and through this rethinking of the traditional conceptions of 
 
55 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 320. 
56 Ibid., p. 340. 
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Being, truth, understanding, interpretation, and logos, Heidegger hints us toward a new 
path of questioning about our relationship with the world.57
 
57 Cf this remark by Holger Zaborowski about the role of hermeneutic understanding Moreover insofar
as this kind of hermeneutics is not concerned with practical advice it is also prior to all practical 
philosophy (be it an ethics of virtue, an ethics of moral obligation, or any other kind of ethics) even 
though it is in a much deeper and more primordial sense a distinctive practice of one s own life that is
the practice of self-awakening which requires a certain independence from others in order freely to think 
 to interpret oneself  for oneself Heidegger s hermeneutics towards a new practice of
understanding in Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays, ed. Daniel Dahlstrom [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011], p. 24). 
 
 
Chapter 2: Against Technology 
1. The Position of Nature in Modernity 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant talks about the human as the sole
being on earth who has reason, and thus the capacity to set voluntary ends [telos] for 
himself, he is certainly the titular lord of nature, and, if nature is regarded as a 
teleological system then it is his vocation to be the ultimate end of nature 1 With the 
absence of God and religiosity in the modern philosophical approach, humans become 
the only ones remaining who are capable of creating values in nature which is in itself 
a value-neutral mechanism. In the hierarchy of autonomous beings, apart from the gods 
and angels, humans reign the highest among all the animals, plants, and the rest of the 
embodiments in nature. So naturally, humans have to be the sovereigns of nature, those 
that govern and dictate all the ends suitable to an inert world. Kant is among many who 
idealized this anthropocentric understanding of our relationship to nature, where we 
are put on a pedestal as higher beings whose vocation, as it turns out, is really to pursue 
ends of nature at the service of humans but not necessarily ends of nature by itself. So, 
 
1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, translated by Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 298. 
Budha 
 
25 
in a peculiar way, the ends of nature become means to the ends of humans. Hans Jonas 
highlights this point even more clearly as he says, if nature is mere object and in no 
sense subject if it is devoid of will then man remains the sole subject and the sole
will And the will of course is a will for power over things The heavens no longer
declare the glory of God but the materials of nature are ready for the use of man 2 
Thus, the world is always at our disposal.3 
Hans Jonas is an important figure in discussing Heidegger s philosophical 
commitments. Jonas studied under Heidgger at the University of Marburg in the 1920s 
and later became a prominent thinker in his own right. Much of his writings echo 
Heidegger s thinking concerning the nature of being and technology. Like Heidegger, 
Jonas also believed that modern science created a concept of theory that grants access 
to the objective truths in nature.4 Jonas says The very conception of reality that
underlay and was fostered by the rise of modern science, i.e., the new concept of nature, 
 
2 Hans Jonas Seventeenth Century and After: The Meaning of the Scientific and Technological 
Revolution in Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man, ed. L. E. Long (Atropos Press, 
2010), p. 71.  
3 Through the new philosophy of Descartes in his Discourse on the Method (trans. Ian Maclean [New York: 
Oxford University Press 2006 p 51 humans can be the masters and possessors of nature a project
set out by Francis Bacon in his The New Organon Also cf Bacon s remark We intend at the end like
honest and faithful guardians) to hand men their fortunes when their understanding is freed from 
tutelage and comes of age, from which an improvement of the human condition must follow, and greater 
power over nature. For by the Fall man declined from the state of innocence and from his kingdom over 
the creatures. Both things can be repaired even in this life to some extent, the former by religion and faith, 
the latter by the arts and sciences.  (The New Organon, Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (eds.) [New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000] in Book II, Aphorism 52, p. 221). 
4 Heidegger talks about science as Wissenschaft, something distinct from episteme, doctrina and scientia, in 
Age of the World Picture in The Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt (New York: 
Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 117. 
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contained manipulability at its theoretical core and, in the form of experiment, involved 
actual manipulation in the investigative process 5 Experimentation presupposes 
manipulability of variables acting in nature, thus  providing hard truths about the 
mechanisms and structures behind everything. In scientific investigation, objects and 
processes in nature can be molded and transformed. But is this phenomenon unique to 
science? Isn't tool making, which we have always done throughout human history, also 
a kind of manipulation? Perhaps it is a matter of degree. Whereas it was the sharpening 
of a stone in the Stone Ages, now it is the splitting of atoms and the changing of our 
own genetic material. If the manipulation of natural objects in early humans was to 
hunt for food, manipulation in modern science is for comprehensive knowledge of 
nature as a whole Jonas makes an interesting point here The very process of attaining
knowledge leads through manipulation of the things to be known, and this origin fits of 
itself the theoretical results for an application whose possibility is irresistible even to 
the theoretical interest, let alone the practical, whether or not it was contemplated in the 
first place 6 Science does not simply view things neutrally but imposes an ordering of 
an interpretation that facilitates control over the object of its inquiry. Jonas poses a 
problem for any endeavour that sets out to pursue knowledge for its own sake, because 
he suspects that the fruits of the knowledge might be irresistible to pursue. 
 
5 Jonas, Seventeenth Century and After in Philosophical Essays, p. 48. 
6 Hans Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biological 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p. 205. 
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Technological science is never simply contemplative and always geared towards the 
practical application of its knowledge. 
Moreover, Jonas believes that the core conviction of modern science was the 
universality of laws behind the one neutral quantitative world stuff that could give
one uniform notion of reality.7 Wherever one goes, one can deduce how anything works 
through particular laws discovered by modern science. Any phenomenon is reducible 
to a set of basic laws These laws are the laws of mechanics and the idea of the world
machine arises It is to be noted that it preceded the machine age 8 The world becomes 
a determinate mechanism guided by physical principles, and to our benefit it becomes 
predictable and convenient. However, this is not to say that through science everything 
is already determined or known. It might take a while, but it is likely that whatever can 
be represented through scientific principles will eventually be known. He adds that 
nature as a great automatism of indifferent forces is devoid of even the most
unconscious bias toward goals, and of the formative power to serve it that final and 
formal causes are struck from its inventory and only efficient causes left 9 There is only 
a movement from one moment to another guided by causes but there is no movement 
to anything in particular There is no real intrinsic end to nature but only the one that
can be assigned to it by humans. If there is a certain direction that nature in its own 
 
7 Jonas, Seventeenth Century and After in Philosophical Essays, p. 68. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., pp. 70, 67. 
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right is heading towards, it has nothing to do with humans in that it does not have any 
grand goal or purpose related to the human. The universe might expand, collapse, or 
disintegrate, only because of cause-effect (efficient) relationships. Jonas effectively 
summarizes this point nature is not a place where one can look for ends Efficient
cause knows no preference of outcomes: the complete absence of final cause means that 
nature is indifferent to distinctions of value. It cannot be thwarted because it has 
nothing to achieve 10  
So, what is the result of all this For Heidegger the world now appears as an
object open to the attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able 
any longer to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for 
modern technology and industry 11 There is nothing normative about nature and all 
norms are to be set by the titular lords who themselves have a vested interest in 
harnessing all the manipulable forces in nature. The instrumental rationality that drives 
science and technology views everything as means to an end and prioritizes the 
accomplishing of the desired ends above anything else.12 Jonas says,  
if nature sanctions nothing, then it permits everything. Whatever man does to it, 
he does not violate an immanent integrity, to which it and all its works have lost 
title. In a nature that is its own perpetual accident, each thing can as well be other 
than it is without being any the less natural. Nature is not a norm (which to 
 
10 Jonas, Seventeenth Century and After in Philosophical Essays, p. 69. 
11 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. by John M. Anderson and Hans Freund (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1966), p. 50. 
12 One can think of this in relation to the moral standpoint of Kant s Kingdom of Ends in Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:433 where beings are ought to be treated as ends and not simply as means. 
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Aristotle it was and a monstrosity is as natural as any normal growth 13 
There is no guiding morality that directs what ought to be done and how we are to act; 
we are guided only by our own agency, which nature itself lacks. There is no 
responsibility that is demanded by natural forces; and in the absence of God, there is no 
one who can hold us accountable for what we do to nature. Nature doesn't owe us 
anything and we don't owe anything to nature.  
2. The Grounding of Science 
 In much of the later writings of Heidegger, there is a push against the supposed 
goal of modern science to draw an objective map of reality. There are two important 
features of modern science that Heidegger highlights: the exactness of its research and 
its objectification of reality He says the rigor of mathematical physical science is
exactitude 14 The rigor of scientific research has to be based on how much the result of 
the experiment adheres to what we already know about natural laws. Whatever is 
found in experimentation must correspond to what Heidegger calls the ground plan of
nature  
No motion or direction of motion is superior to any other. Every place is equal to 
every other. No point in time has preference over any other. Every force is 
defined according to i.e., is only its consequences in motion, and that means 
in magnitude of change of place in the unity of time. Every event must be seen so 
as to be fitted into this ground plan of nature. This projected plan of nature finds 
 
13 Jonas Seventeenth Century and After in Philosophical Essays, p. 70. 
14 Heidegger The Age of the World Picture in The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, 
trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 119.  
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its guar-antee in the fact that physical research, in every one of its questioning 
steps, is bound in advance to adhere to it.15 
This ground plan of nature does not allow any miracles in the physical world. The 
function of science is to find theories that accurately map this ground plan so as to 
denounce any miracles No event is inexplicable nor compatible with the ground plan 
as long as science strictly adheres to its rigorous research. However, Heidegger says this 
is not the case with humanistic sciences which must necessarily be inexact just in
order to remain rigorous 16 This is because there is no ground plan that is already laid 
out about human life before the research is conducted. The research of humanistic 
sciences is to be inexact enough in a hope that one might stumble upon knowledge 
about human life. There is rarely a hierarchy about insights into humanity; as 
Heidegger says No one would pre sume to maintain that Shakespeare s poetry is
more advanced than that of Aeschylus 17  
 Another feature of modern science is portrayed by the statement Science is the 
theory of the real. 18 Here, when Heidegger talks about the real he's talking about the real 
as something that is representable or calculable The real is an object that can be 
known through scientific theories; they are objects are present-at-hand. In the most 
straightforward way, science comes about from the real and is about the real; objectness 
 
15 Heidegger The Age of the World Picture p 119  
16 Ibid., p. 120. 
17 Ibid., p. 117. 
18 Science and Reflection in The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt 
(New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 157. 
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is the prerequisite for scientific investigation.  Heidegger says The real thus becomes
surveyable and capable of being followed out in its sequences. The real becomes 
secured in its objectness. From this, there results spheres or areas of objects that 
scientific observation can entrap after its fashion It is this] through which modern 
science corresponds to the real 19 Reality becomes a collective ordering of objects 
according to the axioms of scientific truths. Any phenomenon that can be measured and 
calculated can essentially be said to be real but if it can t be detected as an object then
it is not real.  
 Heidegger arrives at the conclusion that science becomes representational
because of this focus on the objectness of reality We first arrive at science as research
when and only when truth has been transformed into the certainty of representation. 
What it is to be is for the first time defined as the objectiveness of representing, and 
truth is first defined as the certainty of representing in the metaphysics of Descartes 20 
The certainty that can be represented in a form of scientific objectivity is the hallmark of 
the modern conception of truth and knowledge; such certainty cannot be found in art, 
poetry, or in philosophical discourse. For science, the world is always there in its 
determinate objective existence which makes the world a picture Picture is a
 
19 Heidegger Science and Reflection p 168  
20 Heidegger The Age of the World Picture p 127 This formulation of the minds objective 
representation of the world is seen in Descartes Second Meditation. He says that the object like wax is 
merely something extended flexible and changeable and the perception we have of it is not of vision
or touch or imagination but of purely mental scrutiny Descartes The Philosophical Writings of Descartes 
Vol. II, pp. 20-1). 
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representation, a copy of something so for Heidegger the world picture means the
world conceived and grasped as picture 21 When the world becomes picture it is set 
before us and we are set before it. The picture becomes a structural image that 
determines a specific kind of experience that humans have namely, an experience 
through representation [vorstellen]. Heiddeger adds,  
man contends for the position in which he can be that particular being who
gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is. Because 
this position secures, organizes, and articulates itself as a world view, the 
modern relationship to that which is, is one that becomes, in its decisive 
unfolding, a confrontation of world views.22 
For Heidegger, we give the measure in the way we map out the reality in the 
Cartesian model and in the way we us the resulting knowledge for representing and 
ordering the reality. Because of this, the modern scientific research inevitably leads to a 
worldview where the human has conquered the world as picture. Ultimately, the 
science as the theory of the real gives a representational understanding of reality while 
at the same time revealing objective truths about the world as object  
 But science is clearly useful, and one can provide countless examples of how it 
has been useful What is it useful for The ultimate end of all use is the same as the end
of all activity, and this is twofold: preservation of life, and betterment of life that is, 
promotion of the good life 23 Science is probably the best possible means for the 
 
21 Heidegger The Age of the World Picture p 129  
22 Ibid., p. 134. 
23 Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory p 191  
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preservation of life but the latter depends on what one means by the good life Does
the good life mean a life that is more efficient, easier, or happier? There isn't really a 
clear conception about any of these human states and the notion of the good life 
remains vague, where the moral dimension of lived reality is left out. But if science is to 
be justifiably useful it cannot neglect the question about ends Jonas says Faced with the
threat of catastrophe we may feel excused from inquiring into ends, since averting 
catastrophe is a non-debatable first end suspending all discussion of ultimate ends 24 
Technological science is obviously the most immediate rescue that is most likely to 
succeed in preserving human life in a massive scale. But this is not always the normal 
state of human existence. Even though we might face periods of emergency, there's 
almost always room for reflection, time for assessing our possibilities, goals, and values. 
The anticipation of success says Jonas inherent in all struggle against danger, 
misery, and injustice must face the question of what life befits man when the emergency 
virtues of courage charity and justice have done their work 25 If the questions about 
ultimate ends are not appropriate during catastrophe, then, at the very least, they 
should be reflected upon during periods of leisure and good health.  
 
24 Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory p 208  
25 Ibid., p. 209. 
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3. The Technological Understanding  
Throughout his later writings, there is burgeoning anxiety about technology in 
Heidegger. At first glance, reading his criticism of technology feels like coming from a 
disgruntled romantic who idolizes the simple non-technological lives of previous 
generations. But a more sympathetic reading shows a deep concern on Heidegger s part
for understanding this new phenomenon of machine technology. Technology is 
conventionally understood as means to an end Even though this instrumental
definition of technology is quite plausible, for Heidegger, this could not be further from 
the truth He says wherever ends are pursued and means are employed wherever
instrumentality reigns there reigns causality 26 If technology has to pursue an end, 
then it has to be instrumental and hence be able to create effects through causes. The 
fourfold causality [material, formal, final, and efficient] is the basis on which objects can 
appear in the world. The making of a hammer requires the working of all the causes: 
first, the materials required, then the form it needs to take, then determining for what 
purpose it is being made for, and the effect of bringing forth the finished hammer. This 
bringing-forth [Her-vor-bringen is grounded in revealing Bringing-forth, indeed, 
gathers within itself the four modes of occasioning causality and rules them 
 
26 Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology in The Question Concerning Technology, and Other 
Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013), p. 6. 
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throughout. Within its domain belong end and means, belongs instrumentality. 
Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology 27 But 
instrumental technology forgets the question of final causes (telos) and thus does not 
have the sense of where it is going; it simply moves from one thing to the other so long 
as the process yields useful results. The domain of instrumentality lacks a moral 
dimension that guides and informs any kind of action. Equipment, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, is a mode of revealing; but technological instruments no longer facilitate the 
same way of relating to the world. The instruments have a dislocating effect on the user 
where the user or the practitioner is no longer simply accomplishing the task at hand 
but get swept away by the demands of what Heidegger calls enframing Gestell). The 
oil rig is a technological instrument, and not simply an equipment, that demands specific 
actions from users that it extract the oil, refine it, and distribute it to the buyer.  
 Heidegger contextualizes this understanding of technology as a mode of 
revealing in terms of the Greek origins from the word technikon, which belongs to the 
root word techne Techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of the 
craftsman says Heidegger but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts Techne 
belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis; it is something poietic. From earliest times until 
Plato the word techne is linked with the word episteme. Both words are names for 
 
27 Ibid., p. 12. 
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knowing in the widest sense 28 It meant an active engagement in creating art and 
revealing objects and truths through theory and practice. This conception of techne had 
little to do with the manipulability of the objects and acts as a means to particular ends. 
It was a mode of un-concealing where one could be in touch with truth of the physis 
(nature); it was an activity of knowledge. But what about modern technology? 
Heidegger says that this, too, is a way of revealing but one of challenging
[Herausfordern] which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy 
that can be extracted and stored as such 29 This modern revealing challenges, provokes, 
and demands the objects in nature and is no longer looking for an epistemic or poietic 
engagement; it has no final ends that directs its actions. 
That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked
what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, 
in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew 30 This 
transformation of nature makes nature handy, and always ready to be harnessed 
according to our will. Nature becomes standing-reserve the earth now reveals itself
as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. 31 When nature endures as 
standing-reserve it is no longer seen as an object even; it is simply a congregation of 
 
28 Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology p 13  
29 Ibid., p. 14. 
30 Ibid., p. 16. 
31 Ibid., p. 14. 
Budha 
 
37 
forces that can be ordered, calculated, and used up as system of value-neutral 
information. Standing-reserve is the way things get revealed when the mode of 
revealing is enframing. Heidegger says The essence of modern technology shows itself
in what we call Enframing [Gestell which is a gathering together that belongs to that
setting-upon which sets upon man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in the 
mode of ordering, as standing-reserve 32 Enframing is the revealing of whatever can be 
challenged-forth and ordered in nature. It restricts our whole way of understanding 
nature and its constituent parts and allows to become visible only those things that are 
already conditioned as standing-reserve.  
Heidegger says, The world of science becomes a cybernetic world The
cybernetic blueprint of the world presupposes that steering or regulating is the most 
fundamental characteristic of all calculable world-events 33 The world of machines 
dominates us, not in a literal way as apocalyptic science fiction novels would have us 
believe, but in a way that is more corrosive to our human nature. It does not annihilate; 
it festers. Nowadays each competing worldview declares that its system of values best
promotes human life; that is, the life of the people of the nation promoting the 
particular worldview Values become nothing more than the objectification of needs as
 
32 Ibid., pp. 23-4. 
33 Heidegger The Provenance of Art and the Destination of Thinking, trans. Dimitrios Latsis in Journal 
of the British Society of Phenomenology, 44:2, 119-128, p. 123. Originally translated from Die Herkunft Der
Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens Vortrag in Der Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste in
Athen 4. April 1967). 
Budha 
 
38 
goals 34 Even though our quality of life might be improving through this process of 
need-based value formation, there is no moral direction that tells how we are to relate to 
nature Heidegger gives a biting remark on this matter The devastation of the earth
can easily go hand in hand with a guaranteed supreme living standard for man, and 
just as easily with the organized establishment of a uniform state of happiness for all 
men 35 
It is not only things and places in nature but also people that can be revealed as 
standing-reserve. The coal miners themselves could be just as standing-reserve as the 
coal mining factory; thus, they could become alienated. It might be useful to think of 
this phenomenon in relation to Karl Marx s essay Alienated Labor where Marx
examines the reason why the human species is alienated in two folds: from nature and 
from itself.36 Behind this alienation, he believes, is the process of political economy that 
objectifies the product of the labor as well as the laborer. The laborer is subjected to 
being a commodity that produces commodities, which then surpass the value of the 
laborer that created it. The product as well as the activity stand completely foreign to 
 
34 Zimmerman, Michael E, Eclipse of the Self The Developments of Heidegger s Concept of Authenticit (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1986), Zimmerman, p. 221 also cf his remark on p 222 industrial society as an
authoritative subject and thinking as politics World wars are ways of shoring up faltering economies
wars provide the stability of a constant form of using things up Leaders of power-hungry nations are 
not merely individuals caught up in the blind rage of a selfish egoism but are instruments of world 
destiny  
35 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1968), p. 30. 
36 Karl Marx, Marx: Selected Writings, Lawrence H. Simon (ed.) (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1994), p. 63. 
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the worker and if this detachment from the activity itself pervades the majority of the 
workers time and place the worker is reduced to a mere machine. The self is wasted in 
a production and the relationship of the worker with his own being is severed. The 
whole process of distancing the humans from nature, by classifying it as an object, as 
well as from each other, like in the case of the rich and the working class, becomes a 
barrier to the realization of human progress. Marx makes a compelling argument about 
the present fact of the political economy that inevitably leads to the degradation of
the human spirit through alienation Marx says alienated labor hence turns the species-
existence of man into an existence alien to him, into the means of his individual existence. It 
alienates his spiritual nature, his human essence, from his own body and likewise from 
nature outside him. 37 The process of political economy that employs the human agents 
to an object production results in the split between the worker s own inner and outer
life. As the workers expend their energy and commitment to fulfilling the desires of the 
capitalist, the reconciliation with their own freedom and their intimate connection with 
the natural world becomes impossible. Marx s critique of the political economy
resonates with Heidegger s critique of instrumental rationality of technology. This is the 
technological understanding of beings that both Marx and Heidegger think is so 
pernicious about modernity, as it conveniently facilitates the exploitation and reduction 
of everything in the world. 
 
37 Ibid., p. 64. 
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Nevertheless Heidegger contends that it would be foolish to attack technology
blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil But suddenly
and unaware we find ourselves so firmly shackled to these technical devices that we fall 
into bondage to them 38 Heidegger is not blatantly anti-technology nor does he believe 
that doing away with technology or keeping it under a total control and directing it to 
our rational ends would solve all the problems.39 He says we can use technical
devices, and yet with proper use also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may let go 
of them any time 40 He thinks that our relationship to technology should be free and 
independent, and should not gain total precedence over human life and human 
relationships.41 Our comportment towards technology should be that of releasement
towards things which grants an openness for contemplation that is free from 
Enframing. Heidegger was inspired by idea of releasement Gelassenheit) in the 
Medieval German theologian Meister Eckhart which means to forgo willing and let the 
divine be present in one s soul. Heidegger says, So far as we can wean ourselves from 
willing, we contribute to the awakening of releasement or rather, to keeping awake 
for releasement. 42 So long as we do not aim to impose the metaphysical structuring 
 
38 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 53-4. 
39 Cf Dreyfus Hubert L Heidegger on Gaining a Free Relation to Technology in Heidegger Reexamined 
Vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 163 on the discussion about the approaches of different philosophers 
concerning this issue of rebelling or controlling technology.  
40 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 54.  
41 I will talk more about this idea of freedom in Chapter 3 and 4.  
42 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, pp. 60-1. 
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through a technological interpretation of the world, we become readier, or more awake, 
for releasement, for suspending our willing.43 The real crisis would be when no such 
releasement from technology can be accomplished when technological thinking takes 
over to bewitch dazzle and beguile us so much that calculative thinking may
someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking 44 The danger 
does not just lie in technology itself; it lies in the complete subsumption of calculative 
thought in the totality of human societies, which might completely shift our way of 
thinking irreversibly.
 
43 This also resonates Schopenhauer s conception of the experience of art which entails the suspension of
willing. Art plucks the object of its contemplation from the stream of the world's course, and holds it 
isolated before it It therefore pauses at this particular thing it stops the wheel of time for it the
relations vanish its object is only the essential the Idea Arthur Schopenhauer  The World as Will and 
Representation. Vol. I, trans. E. F. J. Payne [New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969], §36, 185). In the 
experience of the world of Ideas we get a consolation for a brief moment and are lifted away from the 
thralldom of the will Ibid 196 The art object prompts the subject of pure knowing to no longer be
conscious of its individuality and to attend to the Idea, and in doing so suspends the subject from the 
tyranny of world will. I will also develop this idea of releasement as freedom and letting beings be in 
Chapter 3 and 4. 
44 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 56. 
 
 
Chapter 3: A Thinking that Overcomes Metaphysics 
1. The Critique of Metaphysical thinking 
Heidegger traces the problem concerning technology and modern scientific 
research to an underlying metaphysical understanding in Western philosophy. He 
embraces Nietzsche s pronouncement  It is not the victory of science that distinguishes 
our nineteenth century but the victory of scientific method over science 1 These 
advocates of method are primarily Bacon, Descartes, Comte, and even Hegel, whose 
methods were grounded in a predilection to put reality in order and concrete 
objectivity. Nietzsche adds, One should not understand this compulsion to construct
concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws as if they enabled us to fix the real world; but as 
a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in which our existence is made 
possible we thereby create a world which is calculable, simplified, comprehensible, 
etc for us 2 In the pursuit of scientific objectivity, there is no such innocence, no 
neutrality that aims to authentically understand our place in the universe. It is a self-
certain method of inquiry that does not want to examine its grounding assumptions 
and its fundamental groundedness in lived phenomena. Heidegger says,  
 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1968) Aphorism 466. 
2 Ibid., Aphorism 521. 
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Method  here does not signify the tool, with the aid of which scientific research 
elaborates the thematically delimited domain of its objects. Method rather means 
the manner in which any domain of objects to be researched has been delimited 
in advance according to its objectivity. The method is the anticipatory blueprint 
of the world [with a] thoroughgoing calculability of everything, susceptible to 
experimentation and controllable by it. 3  
Technological instrumentation remains the core of all such methods and enframing, the 
challenging-forth of nature, is the result of the generation of thinkers who believed in 
this manner of research. The method is not an open field of questioning and inquiry 
because it already contains a blueprint for what it wants to find or accomplish  
 Analytic philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap did champion scientific thinking in 
philosophy and yet had their own misgivings about traditional metaphysics.4 
Metaphysics purports to say something meaningful by neither asserting any analytic
propositions nor falling within the domain of empirical science but fails because it
is compelled to employ words for which no criteria of application are specified and 
which are therefore devoid of sense, or else to combine meaningful words in such a way 
that neither an analytic (or contradictory) statement nor an empirical statement is 
produced. 5 Any kind of talk outside the logic of language will inevitably lead to 
 
3 Heidegger The Provenance of At and the Destination of Thinking p 122-3. 
4 For the sake of brevity, I will limit my discussion to Carnap. For more discussion on the analytic 
reaction to Heidegger cf Gilbert Ryle Heidegger s Sein und Zeit in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: 
Critical Essays, ed. Michael Murray (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 58 64; Mark A. Wrathall, 
The Conditions of Truth in Heidegger and Davidson The Monist, Vol. 82, No. 2, Continental 
Philosophy: For & Against (April 1999), pp. 304-323 and Charles Guignon Philosophy after
Wittgenstein and Heidegger Heidegger Reexamined Volume 4, eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall 
(London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 227-250. 
5 Rudolf Carnap Overcoming Metaphysics in The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method, ed. 
Richard M. Rorty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 30. 
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senseless speculation that fails to say anything meaningful.6 Carnap adds The
(pseudo)statements of metaphysics do not serve for the description of states of affairs, 
either existing ones (in that case they would be true statements) or nonexisting ones (in 
that case they would be at least false statements). They serve for the expression of the 
general attitude of a person toward life 7 His criticism is targeted towards traditional 
metaphysics since Plato and also towards someone like Heidegger, who himself was 
going against metaphysics Carnap would classify Heidegger s attempt to think more
primoridally than the explicit of apophantic logos as an excuse to delve into metaphysical 
musings about language and the later writings about poetic thinking as a justification 
for a way of life disguised as philosophy.8 Whether or not Carnap s criticism applies to 
Heidegger, we confront the question: what does philosophizing mean? For Heidegger, 
it is a way we find our place in the world and to have a bearing on our own existence. 
For Carnap, and ironically also the metaphysicians that Carnap criticizes, it is a system 
of correct description of the state of affairs whether it be realism idealism or logical
 
6 Cf Lee Braver comment logic eliminates meaningless words and pseudo-statements; positively, it 
clarifies the proper use of concepts and sentences. Ignoring tautologies and contradictions, proper 
language consists in empirically verifiable assertions about the world Analyzing Heidegger A History
of Analytic Reactions to Heidegger in Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays, ed. Daniel Dahlstrom 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011], p. 241). 
7 Carnap Overcoming Metaphysics p 32  
8 Cf Carnap s remark Here we confront personifications of natural phenomena which are the
quasipoetic expression of man's emotional relationship to his environment. The heritage of mythology is 
bequeathed on the one hand to poetry, which produces and intensifies the effects of mythology on life in 
a deliberate way; on the other hand, it is handed down to theology, which develops mythology into a 
system we find that metaphysics also arises from the need to give expression to a man s attitude in life
(Ibid.). 
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positivism Carnap argues that the acceptance or rejection of linguistic forms in any
branch of science, will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments 9 
Heidegger s whole project is an attempt to overcome this way of instrumental 
philosophy the method that wants to subjugate all thinking and speaking to a sign-
system which can be constructed logically or technically, that is, to secure them as an 
instrument of science 10 Even though I agree with Carnap that much of metaphysics 
could be a justification for an attitude toward life rather than truth telling I disagree
that the primary task of philosophy is to construct a clear and distinct grid-like system 
of scientific knowledge.11 
Heidegger says All metaphysics including its opponent positivism speaks the
language of Plato. The basic word of its thinking, that is, of his presentation of the Being 
of beings, is eidos, idea: the outward appearance in which beings as such show 
themselves. Outward appearance, however, is a manner of presence 12  The outward 
appearance that is in a manner of presence can be thought of in terms of the present-
 
9 Rudolf Carnap Empiricism Semantics and Ontology in The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical 
Method, ed. Richard M. Rorty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 83. 
10 Martin Heidegger Phenomenology and Theology in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 56. 
11 Cf Rorty s comment on Heidegger and the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey When they discuss
the relation between philosophy and science, both men see Cartesian, Husserlian, and positivistic 
attempts to make philosophy scientific as a disastrous abandonment of philosophy s proper function
Both see philosophy, at its best, as clearing away what impedes our delight, not as the discovery of a 
correct representation of reality. Both men insist on the goal of philosophy as the reattainment of 
innocence and the divestiture of the culture of our time Overcoming Heidegger and Dewey" in 
Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978], p. 248). 
12 Martin Heidegger The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking in On Time and Being, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 67.  
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at-hand abstraction of the object which anticipates the modern notions of objectivity
For Heidegger, Plato positions humans as detached observers who have a claim to 
knowledge with the means of abstract unchanging forms.13 Heidegger says, 
throughout the whole history of philosophy Plato s thinking remains decisive in
changing forms Metaphysics is Platonism 14 In this framework, all of reality and 
phenomena in nature could be represented through theories and abstractions. Even 
though he believes that theory can be useful, he thinks that it is limited and ultimately it 
masks the more originary encounter with the world around us.15 This sentiment is 
reiterated by Levinas Metaphysical desire does not long for a return for it is the desire
of a land not of our birth for a land foreign to every nature 16 When the world becomes 
a picture, we are removed from nature, a place of our essential dwelling. Heidegger s
turning away from metaphysics takes him back home to the question of human 
dwelling.17 Technological thinking is always looking for the next big thing, the next 
breakthrough, and rarely bothers to look back to where it started. Its self-certainty takes 
 
13 Recall the first section in Chapter 1 where I briefly discussed the limitations of metaphysical distinction 
between a detached ego and objects. 
14 Martin Heidegger The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking p 57  
15 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World A Commentar on Heidegger s Being and Time: Division I 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 1-2 But Plato and our tradition got off on the wrong track by 
thinking that one could have a theory of everything-even human beings and their world-and that the way 
human beings relate to things is to have an implicit theory about them Heidegger is not against theory
He thinks it is powerful and important-but limited  
16 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 
1969), pp. 33-4. 
17 I will discuss the Heidegger s notion of dwelling more thoroughly in Chapter 4.  
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itself to new places and new objects of use. Both Levinas and Heidegger are aware of its 
aim to take us away from our authentic dwelling in the world. 
Another problem for Heidegger was the separation of essence and existence of 
the eternal realm of idea and the transient realm of becoming implicit in Plato's 
thought 18 The distinction between being, which is associated with permanence and 
reality, and becoming, which is associated with transitoriness and a lesser kind of reality, 
or namely representational reality is the product of the metaphysics heralded by
Plato. For Heidegger, this is not an adequate explanation of our being in the world and 
it tries to put reality outside the world we encounter in the world of pure forms or
eidos. Reality turns into stable permanent unchanging presences and being and
essences are conceived in static present terms rather than in active terms 19 The 
phenomenon of how those they can even come to presence is overlooked, if not 
completely ignored as the being who gets thought of as the essent das Wesende] 
becomes an object, either to be beheld . . . or to be acted upon. . . . The original world-
making power physis degenerates into a prototype to be copied and imitated 20 How 
the world emerges is not understood but only that the world is as represented in 
objective forms. 
 
18 Joan Stambaugh, Thoughts on Heidegger (Washington: University Press of America, 1991), pp. 10-1. 
19 Gary Steiner, Animals and the Limits of Postmodernism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 
52. 
20 Ibid., p. 53. 
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Heidegger says due to the manner in which it thinks of beings metaphysics
almost seems to be, without knowing it, the barrier that refuses human beings the 
primordial relation of Being to the human essence 21 Thinking in terms of metaphysics 
denies the acknowledgement of what is essential about human beings namely the 
engaged lived experience of human Dasein. For Heidegger, the essence of being lies in 
existence. But in metaphysics existence has its conceptual roots in existentia, which is 
used interchangeably with actuality, reality, or presence, and he believed that 
philosophers ever since Plato have not really escaped from this conception of being.22 
Medieval philosophy conceives the latter as actualitas. Kant represents existentia as 
actuality in the sense of the objectivity of experience. Hegel defines existentia as the self-
knowing Idea of abso-lute subjectivity. Nietzsche grasps existentia as the eternal 
recurrence of the same 23 All of these versions of the definition of existence force an
interpretation on phenomena in the world where the meaning of being human is 
reduced to how we, as beings or entities, appear or show ourselves; they forget how 
things emerge out of unconcealment into presence and as something available.  
For Heidegger, metaphysics is concerned only with understanding beings, as they 
show themselves, but not being the true essence of human existence Metaphysics says
 
21 Martin Heidegger Introduction to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 281. 
22 Ibid, p. 283. 
23 Martin Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 248. 
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what beings are in bringing to a concept the beingness [ousia] of beings [entities]. In the 
beingness of beings, metaphysics thinks being, yet without being able to ponder the 
truth of being in the manner of its own thinking 24 Metaphysics determines what kind 
of being the human is by pointing out the objective and timeless features of the human 
subject.25 Here, it thinks existence or being through a predicative assignment of properties 
to humans as well as other objects in the world. It can say, for example water boils  
but it cannot say water exists because boiling is a property but existence it is not
as Kant had already observed in the Critique of Pure Reason that existence can be a
linguistic predicate but it is not a real predicate 26 Through the knowledge of 
properties metaphysics can ultimately only point out the being-ness or entity-
ness of beings or entities but not being, as existence, itself; it cannot explain Dasein s
comportment and the practical access to things in the world. Not just that, it obscures 
the question of being by trying to order it and setting demands on how being should 
manifest itself. Therefore Heidegger declares Metaphysics does not ask about the
 
24 Martin Heidegger Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 232 (emphasis added). 
25 Charles Kahn makes an interesting point that the idea of existing the way it is used by Anslem and 
by Descartes as in his I think therefore I am is not realized in the ontology of Plato and Aristotle For
the Greeks existence was determined by their concept of predicative truth X exists always meant X is
something Kahn says that it is naturally the theory of predication and not the concept of existence
that becomes the central and explicit theme of Aristotle s metaphysics as it was the implicit theme of
Plato s discussion of Being in the Sophist Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in 
Greek Philosophy in Essay on Being [New York: Oxford University Press, 2009], p. 73). 
26 Taylor Carman Foreword to Being and Time by Martin Heidegger, trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2008), p. xiv. 
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truth of being itself. Nor does it therefore ask in what way the essence of the human 
being belongs to the truth of being. Metaphysics has not only failed up to now to ask 
this question the question is inaccessible to metaphysics as such 27  
Now if metaphysics fails to capture the essence of being, what is the alternative? 
For Heidegger, it is a change in our conception of human existence: a move away from 
viewing it as existentia, which is fixed and permanent towards viewing it as essentia, 
which is open to the possibilities and change. He says to characterize with a single term 
both the relation of Being to the essence of man and the essential relation of man to the 
openness there Da of Being Sein as such the name of Dasein there-being] 
was chosen for the essential realm in which man stands as man 28 Dasein, as briefly 
discussed in Chapter 1, poses a challenge to the metaphysical abstraction of the world 
as a detached subject and acknowledges the always already being-there of existence. 
Dasein, the being there of the human, is a more originary relationship to the world, as a 
unified phenomenology, than the metaphysics of the Platonic forms or the Cartesian 
ego. It is a standing out into the open possibility of there and being where our
existence makes sense to us. Dasein is our understanding of existence, our making sense 
of our own place in the world; the world is not separate from our own existence but is 
 
27 Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 246. Heidegger also suggests that metaphysics also 
fails to recognize the ontological difference between being and beings and puts them together and 
conflates the two. 
28 Heidegger Introduction to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 283.  
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always already accessible in a meaningful way. This phenomenon of standing-out in 
existence is what Heidegger calls ek-sistence  
Heidegger says ek-sistence, thought in terms of ecstasis, does not coincide with 
existentia in either form or content. In terms of content, ek-sistence means standing out 
into the truth of being and that the the ecstatic essence of the human being consists in 
ek-sistence, which is different from the metaphysically conceived existentia 29 The root 
of both the words ecstatic and ek-sistence originates from the Greek ekstasis
which literally means to stand out of oneself Here Heidegger uses this way of 
phrasing existence because he wants to connote the idea of standing or being in the 
world by staying outside of the ego or the subjective self. To ek-sist is to be aware not 
just of the self but also outside of the self, the world; it is always already being beyond 
one s current situation by anticipating other possibilities in the future  Because humans 
can have this kind of consciousness, Heidegger thinks we have a unique relationship to 
Being. Moreover, Heidegger warns against a potential misconstrual of this essence of 
existence as a Platonic form that exists outside of the conscious world. He says, 
The ecstatic essence of existence is therefore still understood inadequately as 
long as one thinks of it as merely a standing out  while interpreting the out
as meaning away from the interior of an immanence of consciousness or spirit
For in this manner existence would still be represented in terms of subjectivity
and substance while in fact the out ought to be understood in terms of the 
outside itself of the openness of Being itself 30  
 
29 Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, pp. 249, 248. 
30 Heidegger Introduction to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 283. 
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In one sense the standing out can easily be thought of as standing objectively as a
detached subject looking out into the world of appearances. But this would be a 
misguided understanding of ek-sisting, and this formulation of the essence of existence 
would be nothing different than the one already dominant one, namely existentia. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger thinks that it is possible to rework our predilection for 
metaphysical thinking towards a freer and a more open understanding of essence, 
which will grant us more intimacy to Dasein. Stambaugh quotes an example by 
Heidegger a desk can never touch a wall The desk might be physically smack up
against the wall but it can never touch that wall in the way a person can touch it 31 But 
this does not mean that because a desk cannot touch the wall and cannot be aware of
itself being in the world it is not real and does not exist The desk exists as existentia, 
with its extended properties, but it cannot exist as essentia, as a thing that can realize 
and contemplate possible futures. Therefore, humans are the only entities that exist 
essentially in the world.32 Here it is quite easy to see Heidegger s obsession for pointing
out the specialty of humans over the rest of the sentient world. However, he wants to 
distinguish his position from humanism, the system of thought that places an important 
value on human rationality and autonomy.  
 
31 Stambaugh, Thoughts on Heidegger, p. 61. 
32 Cf Heidegger s discussion of this issue in Introduction to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 283: 
The proposition the human being alone exist does not at all mean that the human being alone is a real
being while all other beings are unreal and mere appearances or human representations it means the
human being is that being whose Being is distinguished by an open standing that stands in the 
unconcealedness of Being proceeding from Being in Being  
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He says that every humanism after the first Roman humanism has presupposed
the most universal essence of the human being to be obvious that the human being is
the animal rationale 33 This is already a predicative interpretation of beings that has not 
yet pondered the question of what it is to be essentially Humanism is either grounded
in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground of one 34 It is not concerned about 
the truth of being but only about a certain kind of metaphysics of beings. It is certainly 
grounded in metaphysical thinking and it would not be a surprise if it was itself a 
ground of a metaphysics that aims to claim mastery over nature through superior 
human rationality Heidegger says every humanism remains metaphysical In
defining the humanity of the human being, humanism not only does not ask about the 
relation of being to the essence of the human being; be-cause of its metaphysical origin 
humanism even impedes the question by neither recognizing nor understanding it 35 
Just like the original critique of metaphysics, Heidegger lays the same kind of 
accusation to humanism, that it is not concerned with our primordial encounter but 
only with a secondary one. 
2. From Calculative Thinking to Meditative Thinking 
Heidegger thinks there is a natural extension of metaphysics that takes over our 
 
33 Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 245. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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whole approach to scientific research called calculative thinking Calculative
thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time 
more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. 
Calculative thinking never stops never collects itself 36 This kind of thinking does not 
just imply its use in machines or computers, but something more ominous that it 
overtakes our very way of interacting with the world. It thinks in computation of 
entities and theorizes their properties and creates a reality of its own. As Nietzsche says, 
Calculability exists precisely because things are unable to be other than they are 37 In 
metaphysical thinking, things can appear only as calculable and determinable and are 
unable to appear as they would if we let them.38   
But calculative thinking, as discussed in the Chapter 2, is not neutral, and values 
that are attached to this thinking is self-serving as it always moves towards efficiency 
and mastery over the objects. This kind of thinking doesn't bother to wait and ask about 
its own commitments and why it is underway; efficiency becomes an end in itself. 
Heidegger says, calculation refuses to let anything appear except what is countable. 
Everything is only whatever it counts The calculative process of resolving beings into
 
36 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and Hans Freund (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1966), p. 46. 
37 Nietzsche, The Will To Power, Aphorism 634. 
38 However, this letting things appear should not be thought of as trying to grasp the in-itself [noumenal] 
essences of things as Nietzsche says in his discussion of truth and falsity There is no essence-in-itself it
is only relations that constitute an essence just as there can be no knowledge-in-itself The Will To 
Power, Aphorism 625). 
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what has been counted counts as the explanation of their being. Calculation uses all 
beings in advance as that which is countable, and uses up what is counted for the 
purpose of counting. 39 The only way beings manifest themselves is under the 
categories of whether they are countable or not. This eventually becomes a reductionist 
mode of dealing with existence and in doing so existence is interpreted in the same 
vein. Perhaps it is a metaphysical cycle that explains nothing but itself and is 
preoccupied with serving its own efficient ends, which Bacon and Descartes valorized. 
Heidegger adds thanks to this calculability, the world becomes always and 
everywhere subject to human dominance. Method signifies the victorious challenging 
of the world for its thoroughgoing availability to humankind 40 The mastery of nature 
and other beings is the hallmark of calculative thinking, which is inherently 
technological in its essence.  
 Heidegger says calculative thinking compels itself into a compulsion to master
everything on the basis of the consequential correctness of its procedure 41 The two 
ideas of mastery and truth as correctness form the centerpiece of this sort of
thinking. As discussed in Chapter 2, this impulse of mastery over things comes from a 
long tradition in Western philosophy where the world is thought as being at our 
disposal, ready to be manipulated. In the very conception of the world s existence
 
39 Heidegger Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 235. 
40 Heidegger The Provenance of At and the Destination of Thinking p 123  
41 Heidegger Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 235. 
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calculability and manipulability are revealed as presence or as actual, which gives rise to 
the standing-reserve of nature in technological instrumentality. Mastery in thinking 
suggests a possibility of an absolute representation of all reality in theory or axioms. 
Reality, then, is nothing but a mechanism that can be encountered in calculations and 
can be assessed in terms of correctness. The hope is that so far as the procedure of 
experimentation and counting is correct, or corresponds to the already theorized system 
of facts, the result can be quantified and truth about things could be encountered. But it 
is so bound up on its own metaphysics for the sake of controlling nature that it fails to 
point to any truth outside of itself, and simply ends up with more calculation and more 
exactness. 
 Heidegger says exact thinking is never the most rigorous thinking if rigor
indeed receives its essence from the kind of rigorous effort whereby knowledge in each 
case maintains itself within a relation to what is essential in beings. Exact thinking 
merely binds itself to the calculation of beings and serves this end exclusively 42 If the 
aim of knowledge is to inquire into essential relation between us and the world, exact 
thinking becomes directionless. This kind of thinking is rigorous only insofar as rigor is 
assessed in terms of correspondence to the axioms and that it is counts; anything else, 
exactness loses its relevance. With this Heidegger wants to point towards what he 
believes to be a more promising kind of thinking, one whose rigor has nothing to do 
 
42 Heidegger Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 235. 
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with counting or metaphysical abstractness. The rigor of this other kind of thinking 
does not consist merely in an artificial that is technical-theoretical exactness of 
concepts. It lies in the fact that saying remains purely in the element of the truth of 
being and lets the simplicity of its manifold dimensions rule 43 This thinking is a 
participation in truth-telling of Dasein and our relationship to it, and not a theorizing of 
objective and timeless concepts Heidegger uses the terms essential thinking and
meditative thinking to convey this formulation of thinking that seeks to amend the
legacy of metaphysical thinking. 
 In his Letter on Humanism Heidegger recounts a story of the Pre-Socratic 
thinker Heraclitus, who once gets visited by foreigners who are curious about how he is 
living as a thinker The foreigners who wish to visit the thinker expect to catch sight of
him perchance at that very moment when, sunk in profound meditation, he is 
thinking Instead of this the sightseers find Heraclitus by a stove 44 Obviously, they 
were disappointed at the sight of the great thinker doing a mundane task of lighting a 
fire like anybody else. What they did not realize that is that the practical life of the 
thinker and his comportment in his dwelling gives meaning to his existence. Heraclitus 
is engaging in understanding of his place by lighting a fire in order to anticipate a near 
future that gives warmth to his dwelling. He did not make his way of being explicit 
 
43 Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 241. 
44 Ibid., p. 270. 
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through apophantic assertion to the sightseers. A kind of meditation that does not feel 
the need to express itself explicitly is anticipated by Heidegger s early work Being and 
Time and is realized more fully in his later writings such as the Letter on Humanism
and Discourse on Thinking Whenever one thinks of meditation, one expects that it 
constitutes inactivity, that it may be palliative but is nevertheless, a state of doing 
nothing But thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it
or because it is applied says Heidegger thinking acts insofar as it thinks 45 It is not a 
phenomenon that is separate from the rest of the world. So long as we are thinking and 
questioning concerning our relationship to the world and our Dasein, we are already 
acting, being in the world in a certain way. He says, thinking is l engagement par l Etre
pour l Etre engagement by being for being and this can be accomplished only if we
can free ourselves from a technical interpretation of thinking as in the case of 
metaphysics.46 Even the distinction of the two modes of theoria and praxis in thinking is 
already within a technical interpretation  
 Heidegger adds This meditative thinking is what we have in mind when we
say that contemporary man is in flight-from-thinking. Yet you may protest: mere 
meditative thinking finds itself floating unaware above reality. It loses touch. It is 
 
45 Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 239. 
46 Ibid. 
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worthless for dealing with current business 47 It is probably true that meditative 
thinking has no practical value, if that value depends on the immediacy of tangible use. 
This is where calculative thinking has no problems showing its results as every major 
technological breakthrough has been made in the realm of calculation. But this 
mysterious meditative thinking seems like it has nothing else to offer. This is because 
either this thinking is complete nonsense, an artificial concoction by an ascetic, or this 
thinking is quite difficult and has not been attempted often enough in philosophy. 
Aristotle s idea of the contemplative life is helpful in informing what Heidegger means
by meditation. Aristotle thought that contemplation (the ria) satisfies the essential 
criteria for happiness (eudaimonia) done for the sake of itself. He says that unlike the 
virtues of pleasures and justice, contemplation is the only activity which alone would 
seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the 
contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the 
action. 48 Contemplation does not demand any action but it is not the same a passive 
 
47 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 46; also see his remark: Because man is a thinking, that is, a 
meditating being. Thus meditative thinking need by no means be high-flown.  It is enough if we dwell on 
what lies close and meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and 
now here on this patch of home ground now in the present hour of history p 47  
48 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Book X, 
1177b, p. 194. However, it is to be noted that Aristotle s theoria was the contemplation of unchanging and 
necessary truths, which is something that Heidegger would characterize as metaphysical thinking. But 
this characterization of Aristotle is not entirely tenable because Aristotle himself has a more varied notion 
of what contemplation means especially in Book VI Intellectual Virtue where he distinguishes
contemplating of variable and invariable things as well as scientific and calculative knowledge
(Ibid., 1139a, p. 103). 
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imagination or wishful thinking. It is an exercise of the intellect but not for any specific 
purpose. Heidegger, as the proponent of this kind of thinking, obviously claims the 
latter as he says, at times it requires a greater effort. It demands more practice. It is in 
need of even more delicate care than any other genuine craft. But it must also be able to 
bide its time to await as does the farmer whether the seed will come up and ripen 49 
One requires waiting, patience, and diligence on their part to even attempt this sort of 
thinking, but given that the world of calculation is so much efficient and faster, it is easy 
to brush it off out of inconvenience. Yet, this does not mean that such a thinking cannot 
be attempted. 
Heidegger says Such thinking responds to the claim of being through the
human being letting historical essence be responsible to the simplicity of a singular 
necessity, one that does not necessitate by way of compulsion, but creates the need that 
fulfills itself in the freedom of sacrifice 50 It does not impose any preconceived structure 
on its path towards thinking but situates itself within an open of possibilities of 
meaning; it is a thinking that sets beings free, responds to being, without wanting to 
force an interpretation.51 But this notion of freedom is not mere absence of constraint
with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor is it on the other hand mere readiness for 
 
49 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, pp. 46-7. 
50 Heidegger Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 236. 
51 Ibid p 237 The thinking of being seeks no hold in beings Essential thinking heeds the measured
signs of the incalculable and recognizes in the latter the un-foreseeable arrival of the unavoidable  
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what is required and necessary and so somehow a being 52 It is not a faculty 
possessed by humans but is a ground for the possibility of unconcealment, of 
encountering truth as in its fundamental form as well as in correctness Freedom for
what is opened up in an open region lets beings be the beings they are. Freedom now 
reveals itself as letting beings be 53 Truth as correctness does not allow this sort of 
freedom to pervade as it forces a pre-given interpretation on things. In modernity, this 
imposition took the form of subject-object representation of the world. But for 
Heidegger, we are beings that are able participate in the freedom of letting things be 
and can situate ourselves in the thrownness of the past and the projection towards the 
future. Only insofar as we take heed of this open region of freedom can we be more 
attuned to be authentically. The thinking of contemplation dwells on this region.  
We err in our thinking if we forget this realm of freedom and unconcealment. 
Errancy is the essential counteressence to the originary essence of truth Errancy opens
itself up as the open region for every counterplay to essential truth. Errancy is the open 
site for and ground of error. Error is not merely an isolated mistake but the kingdom 
(the dominion) of the history of those entanglements in which all kinds of erring get 
interwoven 54 Thinking must not forget that beings are first concealed and if essential 
 
52 Heidegger On the Essence of Truth in Pathmarks, p. 145. 
53 Ibid., p. 144. I will talk more about this in Chapter 4.  
54 Ibid., p. 150. This is a hint that we cannot assure ourselves that we can establish a complete control over 
being and truth. The confidence in this assurance is why traditional metaphysics is mistaken. 
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truth is the letting be of unhiddenness, the essential error is the letting be of hiddenness. 
The erring that is commonly conceived as the incorrectness of judgments and falsity of
knowledge, is only one mode of erring and moreover the most superficial one 55 
Erring leads us astray into a muddling of our place in the world and leads to a 
forgetting of being, because of which we usually find refuge in the thinking of clear and 
distinct ideas of metaphysics. But thinking in an originary manner listens to the voice of 
being and obedient to the voice of being seeks from being the word through which
the truth of being comes to language 56 Thinking in this way grants a path for truth to 
come to language. Heidegger makes an interesting statement All refutation in the field
of essential thinking is foolish Strife among thinkers is the lovers quarrel concerning
the matter itself. It assists them mutually toward a sim-ple belonging to the Same, from 
which they find what is fitting for them in the destiny of being 57 
Any kind of thinking that attends to the word of being and lets the truth unfold 
will not find a difference in what it encounters. The encounter of unconcealment of one 
essential thinker is necessarily the same as that of the other; thinking before calculation 
thinks the same. This notion in Heidegger is inspired by Heraclitus, who said (in 
Fragment DK 50 Listening not to me but to the logos [the Saying], it is wise [to 
 
55 Ibid., p. 151. 
56 Heidegger Postscript to What is Metaphysics p 237  
57 Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 256. 
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sophon] to agree [homo-logein] that all things are one [hen panta einai 58 In saying 
listening not to me but to the logos, Heraclitus denounces his subjectivity and
attempts to listen to the more primordial phenomena happening around him and thinks 
of what appears before him as the one and the same. In his essential thinking, he 
overcomes confusion that arises in the explicit form of logos [apophansis]. Charles Kahn 
says The reference to a logos somehow independent of Heraclitus will be immediately 
clear if he has just spoken of the deep logos of the soul The thought will be listen not
to me but to the discourse within your soul and it will tell you all 59 This deep logos is 
anticipated by Heidegger s hermeneutic logos, which engages in disclosing meanings in 
practical contexts But Kahn s understanding of logos is not quite the same as that of 
Heidegger; nevertheless, both speak of a pervasiveness of disclosure that is neither 
confined within an ego-subject nor disassociated into a universal objectivity. Also, there 
is a unity, an agreement (homologein) in the thinkers when they heed this deeper logos. 
Heraclitus also says An unapparent aphan s] connection [harmonia] is stronger 
[kreitt n] than an apparent [phaneros one 60 This suggests that the hidden connection 
with the world is much stronger than any connection that is made explicit thereafter. 
 
58 Patricia Curd (ed.), A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 2011), p. 42. 
59 Charles Kahn, Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 130; also 
cf. my discussion of discourse and logos in Chapter 1. 
60 Curd, A Presocratics Reader, p. 45; Kahn translates it as The hidden attunement [harmonia] is better than 
the obvious one Kahn, Art and Thought of Heraclitus, p. 65). 
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Once we make a harmony apparent, harmony becomes weaker.61 Our hermeneutic 
involvement in the world becomes weaker and becomes something other than itself in 
the mode of assertion. Essential thinking, whether or not it is actually possible to 
accomplish, is this attempt to ponder these unapparent connections and allow for a 
venturing into the unknown hiddenness of existence. It is the attempt to be at home in 
the world.62
 
61 This particular way of formulation was suggested by Prof Jeffrey Turner also cf Kahn s commentary
And it is no accident that the same title may describe his mode of expression where the immediate
surface meaning is often less significant than the latent intention carried by allusion enigma and
resonance Kahn Art and Thought of Heraclitus, p. 203). 
62 Eva Brann in her Logos of Heraclitus (Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books Inc., 2011) appropriately quotes 
Charles Baudelaire Nature is a temple whose living pillars Sometimes allow confused words to
emerge Man passes there through forests of symbols Which observe him with familiar looks p 134  
 
 
Chapter 4: Dwelling and the Path to Poetic Thinking 
1. Thinking in the Destitute Time 
Essential thinking becomes absolutely crucial in finding our place in the world. 
But have we found our place, our dwelling? Have we become alienated? Heidegger 
poses these two questions What is the state of dwelling in our precarious age and
and what are poets for in a destitute time 1 Before these questions can be dealt with, 
we must first understand what this destitute or precarious time is What emerges
as the primary object of this destitution is the homelessness of human beings the lack
of a dwelling, and the fleeing of gods, all of which are intimately related. 
Homelessness so understood consists in the abandonment of beings by being. 
Homelessness is the symptom of the oblivion of being. Because of it the truth of being 
remains unthought 2 This homelessness is the consequence of our detachment from 
our understanding of our own essence, the way we are in the world. Our destitution is a 
product of hiddenness of essences and meanings and concealment of truth as well as 
 
1 Martin Heidegger What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New 
York Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2013 p 89 Building Dwelling Thinking in Poetry, Language, 
Thought, p. 158. 
2 Martin Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 258. This is reminiscent of the Early German 
Romantic poet Novalis who said Philosophy is really homesickness the desire to be everywhere at home
(in Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon, translated and edited by David W. 
Wood [Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007] entry 857, p. 155).  
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the path towards it. It occurs when our calculated ordering of nature gives rise to the 
illusion about the prosperity and the abundance of our time. When metaphysical 
thinking becomes too enamored with itself, it loses the trace of the essential path. It 
becomes destitute by losing the path that leads away from this destitution. When the 
destitute time is no longer able even to experience its own destitution then appears
the time s absolutely destitute character 3 This destitution of homelessness is the 
forgetting of Being by human beings.  
Heidegger says that the human being is the being whose being as ek-sistence 
consists in his dwelling in the nearness of being. The human being is the neighbor of 
being 4 As noted previously Heidegger uses ek- to talk about the thrownness of our 
existence into the world. We do not simply exist as objects in the world. Heidegger 
thinks that our existence is a thrown existence; we are hurled into existence without our 
say in the matter What throws in such projection is not the human being but being 
itself, which sends the human being into the ek-sistence of Da-sein that is his essence 5 
Thrownness means that we exist historically and have a surplus of meaningful 
connectedness to our past. But in our thrownness, we are not chained to the past; we are 
also projected towards the future. This projection is the condition for the possibility of 
actualizing what we seek to actualize. Understanding, our sense-making activity of 
 
3 Heidegger What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 91. 
4 Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 261. 
5 Ibid., p. 257. 
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Being, is what projects us to this future, to the possibility of revealing the meaning of 
our being Understanding is thought at the same time from out of the unconcealedness
of Being. Understanding is ecstatic, thrown projection, where ecstatic means: standing 
in the realm of the open 6 We exist essentially in this thrownness of the past and the
open projection to the future. We are faced with making choices and willing. We are 
faced with the predicament of actualizing multiple possibilities. 
Moreover Heidegger says this destiny of thrown projection] propriates as the 
clearing of being which it is The clearing grants nearness to being 7 The clearing is the 
realm of freedom that lets human beings participate in a more fundamental 
encountering of the world. We are free to the possibility of being in touch with our own 
essence. As long as there is no such clearing, we cannot recognize or even begin to 
encounter the essence of existence our Dasein Thus the clearing of being is to be
understood in terms of this thrown projection ; it is the open space of meaning. 
World is the clearing of being into which the human being stands out on the basis of
his thrown essence 8 The world is always primarily the basis of our existence. Our 
thrownness cannot be anywhere but in the world as manifested openness. It is the 
ground in which beings like us occur and emerge in time. This is why Heidegger thinks 
 
6 Martin Heidegger Introduction to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 286. 
7 Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 257. 
8 Ibid., p. 266. 
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that human Dasein has a unique relationship with existence. One aspect of the 
uniqueness of humans that is denied to entities such as animals and plants is the 
nearness to the truth of existence as Heidegger says man s being open is a being held
toward whereas the animal s being open is a being taken by and thereby a being
absorbed in its encircling ring 9 Humans have the freedom to exist in the openness and 
thus make sense of their existence in this freedom. Animals are essentially unfree in that 
they are within the open realm that remains before the human. This leads Heidegger to 
say that humans are world-forming and animals are world-poor 10 
But this does not lead to the conclusion that the human being is the lord of
beings instead the human being is the shepherd of being 11 Human beings as entities 
in the world do not have precedence over other entities. Being, as an essential clearing, 
is not one of the faculties that is at our disposal and is not something that we have 
mastery over At best we are shepherds of Being we are the caretakers of Being We
respond to Being with a responsibility to preserve our essential relation to it. The 
lordship of nature is a residue of the metaphysical thinking that has dominated our 
present discourse whereas the thinking that thinks from the question concerning the
truth of being questions more primordially than metaphysics can. Only from the truth 
 
9 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, p. 343. 
10 Ibid., p. 177. 
11 Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 260. 
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of being can the essence of the holy be thought 12 Only this kind of thinking can think 
more primordially and rigorously than the thinking of metaphysics. When Heidegger 
talks about the holy, it is not clear if he is suggesting it as religious practice. 
Nonetheless, there is a religious dimension to the idea of the holy in Heidegger, as it is 
thought of as a place of ritual practice, our comportment towards a way of being in the 
world Insofar as thinking limits itself to its task it directs the human being at the 
present moment of the world's destiny into the primordial dimension of his historical 
abode 13 Thinking about the truth of our being directs our attention to the manner in 
which we inhabit the earth, our dwelling, our historical abode But what is this
dwelling? 
Heidegger says that dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth 14 
This idea of dwelling is quite contrary to how we conventionally understand dwelling, 
which is a mere occupying of a lodging 15 Heidegger thinks of dwelling as a place of 
freedom as he says that to dwell to be set at peace means to remain at peace within
the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. The 
fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving. 16 In this formulation, 
dwelling sets at peace this open region of freedom for beings to be close to their Being, 
 
12 Ibid., p. 267. 
13 Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 267. 
14 Heidegger Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 146.  
15 Heidegger Poetically Man Dwells Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 213.  
16 Heidegger Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 147. 
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as freedom here is revealed as letting beings be 17 Letting beings be is not to be 
understood in a negative sense of letting alone, of renouncing it, of indifference and 
even neglect it is the heeding and preserving of Being 18 Thus letting be is a being
at home with our own existence and taking care of the home, the dwelling place. It is 
what saves us from the danger of losing ourselves, of being homeless, of losing our 
relationship to Being Heidegger quotes Hölderlin But where danger is, grows / The 
saving power also 19 In this danger of losing ourselves and our bearing in the world, if 
we are able to recognize where we have erred and what is wrong with our condition, we 
are also able to save ourselves from the very danger But this saving does not only
snatch something from a danger. To save really means to set something free into its 
own presencing 20 Just as dwelling lets beings be, human beings must also let dwelling, 
the earth, be; human beings must save the earth. But by saving the earth, the mortal 
does not master the earth and does not subjugate it but becomes a caretaker a
shepherd of the Being of beings.21 In saving the earth, we mortals do not become 
saviors because a savior traditionally understood as a detached being intervening on the 
matter at hand; but for Heidegger, it is rather to be understood as an engaged being 
 
17 Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 248. 
18 Martin Heidegger On the Essence of Truth in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 144.  
19 Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology p 34  
20 Heidegger Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought p 148 Letter on Humanism
Pathmarks, p. 252. 
21 Heidegger Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 146. 
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who has just as much of a stake on nature as nature itself.  
Heidegger recalls the saying of Heraclitus Fragment 119 which goes ethos 
anthropoi daimon, usually translated as A man s character is his daimon 22 Ethics
which is rooted in the Greek word ethos bears the weight of the meaning of the word 
abode An ethical life is a dwelling in the nearness of divinity of daimon. Heidegger 
further interprets this saying The familiar abode for humans is the open region for
the presencing of god (the unfamiliar one 23 This suggests that only by dwelling can 
we exist in the openness to the unfamiliar realm of the holy, which demands our ethical 
attention and care. Only by being situated in the familiar realm of our dwelling can we 
then venture towards the unfamiliar realm of the holy. Our destitution occurs when our 
dwelling our ethos itself becomes unfamiliar to us To dwell means to be in the
presence of the holy. However, the kind of thinking that truly ponders the truth of our 
being and so defines the human being s essential abode is set out neither by ethics nor
by ontology.24 If philosophy is to overcome its grounding in metaphysics, it has to think 
more rigorously, as discussed in Chapter 3, and ponder our essential way of being in 
the world. It cannot simply satisfy itself with the truths created by apophantic logos. It 
has to dwell on our more originary relationship with the world through hermeneutic 
logos. This thinking has to care about the ethical bond in the time of technological
 
22 Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 269. 
23 Ibid., p. 271. 
24 Ibid., p. 271. 
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human beings 25 Our ethical bonds become even more important, become more 
threatened, once there is a calculated ordering by a metaphysical thinking that creates a 
separation between us and other entities, nature, and Being itself. A calculated 
gathering is not a poetic gathering fostered by art and safeguarded by our dwelling. We 
might be able to live in technology but not dwell in it.  
We measure deeds of scientific knowledge and its research projects by the
impressive and successful achievements of praxis 26 But the deed of thinking is 
neither theoretical nor practical nor is it the conjunction of these two forms of
comportment and yet it is a deed a deed that surpasses all praxis thinking
permeates action and production, not through the grandeur of its achievement and not 
as a consequence of its effect, but through the humbleness of its inconsequential 
accom plishment 27 The thinking that Heidegger wants us to participate in is not 
subservient to practical use For Heidegger questioning is the piety of thought 28 
Thinking, as discussed in Chapter 3, is the same as questioning; it is an opening up of a 
horizon of possibilities in order to recognize our ends and well as being in tune with 
our origins. It attends to the clearing of being, the thrown projection of our existence. 
Hans Jonas gave an interesting insight into this matter He says that in Aristotle s
 
25 Ibid., p. 268. 
26 Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 257.  
27 Ibid., p. 274. 
28 Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology p 35  
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thinking speculative theoretical sciences were concerned with unchangeable and
eternal first causes and intelligible forms of being without an action of their own and 
the practical sciences were concerned with experiential knowledge by the planned
changing of the changeable 29 The practical sciences are valuable because they are 
engaged in producing results that are applicable, whereas the theoretical sciences were 
done for their own sake But as Descartes gave birth to a theory with inherently
technological potential it resulted in a fusion of theory and practice 30 Theory 
became transformed to serve the function of knowledge and praxis. It was no longer an 
activity done for its own sake. It was no longer a deed but became a means for all deeds; 
theory became an instrument.  
Now, one asks the question: what is the use for this new kind of theory that has 
technological potential Jonas says The ultimate end of all use is the same as the end
of all activity, and this is twofold: preservation of life, and betterment of life that is, 
promotion of the good life 31 As I had mentioned in Chapter 2, as far as the 
preservation of life is concerned, this new scientific theory has proven extremely useful 
with the modern technology of medicine, health services, and increase in the overall 
longevity of human life. It has also given rise to new technologies in architecture that 
 
29 Hans Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biological, p. 
189. 
30 Ibid., p. 190. 
31 Ibid., p. 191. 
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can sufficiently cope with the effects of earthquakes and tsunamis. The list of the 
achievements of this scientific theory is inexhaustible and there is no denying the 
inherent goodness of these acts. However, only inquiring about how the preservation of 
life can be accomplished and how catastrophes can be averted might make us feel
excused from inquiring into ends 32 It would be ridiculous to think about how to save 
for a retirement plan when one is inside a burning house. Obviously, averting 
catastrophe is an urgent matter and there is nothing more competent than technological 
science to resolve these issues of emergencies But Jonas says the anticipation of
success inherent in all struggle against danger, misery, and injustice must face the 
question of what life befits man when the emergency virtues of courage, charity, and 
justice have done their work 33 For Heidegger thinking of a new kind that is neither
practical or theoretical has this responsibility to inquire into the truth of our existence
our ultimate end. Thinking of this kind is a deed that denies this metaphysical 
distinction of theory and practice. It not only thinks about the ends but also the origins; 
thinking about the end of being is ultimately thinking about the origin. In the 
conventional use of the word origin there is no suggestion towards ends and has a
connotation of being more primitive than ends temporally, as well as in terms of 
sophistication. But for Heidegger, the question about ends is intimately bound up with 
 
32 Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory p 208  
33 Ibid., p. 208. 
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the question about origins. Thinking of this sort is circular in that it ends up where it 
begins something that is echoes in the Heraclitus Fragment 79 B103 The beginning
and the end are common in the circumference of a circle and Parmenides Fragment 5
for me it is indifferent from where I am to begin: for that is where I will arrive back 
again But the destitution of our time is such that what must already be familiar to
us, our origin, remains concealed. As long as we cannot situate ourselves in our origins, 
we cannot think about our ultimate ends. As long as we cannot dwell, we cannot 
encounter the holy. Origin is what takes us back to our being, which something that 
modern thought has forgotten. 
However, in pursuing our origin and philosophizing about the primordial 
human essence isn t Heidegger committing an error that Nietzsche dreaded in his
Genealogy of the Morals? That was the error that permeated philosophy since Plato to 
Hegel that in its pursuit of the origin Ursprung it aimed to capture the exact
essence of things their purest possibilities and their carefully protected identities 34 
The origin was thought of as a pure, untarnished essence that can somehow be captured 
through methods that are also pure, transcendent, or absolute. Someone like Kant did 
not simply venture to pinpoint the exact essence of reason but also the essence of 
morality, the practical sphere of human life. Whenever someone speaks of human 
 
34 Michel Foucault Nietzsche Genealogy History in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rainbow (New York: 
Pantheon, 1984), p. 78. 
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nature as so and so or talks about the nature or essence of things, one is attempting to 
point at an immobile time or space that precedes all events. Foucault says that the 
fixation on origins is a metaphysical extension which arises from the belief that things 
are most precious and essential at the moment of birth. 35 But when dealing with 
Heidegger s approach one should not think of origin as these independent entities
that precede all contingencies; the origin is grounded in the temporality as an 
admixture of countless meanings surrounding it Therefore Heidegger s pursuit of
origins is the kind of pursuit that Nietzsche, in fact, thinks is the task of the thinker, 
which is to trace the origin as genealogy (Herkunft) and not as Ursprung. Foucault says, 
an examination of descent Herkunft) also permits the discovery, under the unique 
aspect of a trait or a concept, of the myriad events through which they were formed. 
Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that 
operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things 36 The approach of the genealogist 
is very much attentive to the historical details that a traditional metaphysical historian 
might count as insignificant, and addresses the chains that were broken, replaced, 
abused, trampled with, or valorized. The genealogist carefully traces the Heraclitean 
circle but does not attempt to skip it or completely abandon it thus dispel s the
chimeras of the origin 37 Heidegger, arguably, is such a genealogist in his endeavor to 
 
35 Foucault Nietzsche Genealogy History p 79  
36 Ibid., p. 81. 
37 Ibid., p. 80. 
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find the path to this historical dwelling of human beings. Heidegger is not looking for a 
romantic revival of the origins of our questioning of being, but is working towards 
unfolding the historical traces that distorted the meaning of Being in order to rethink 
being by a deeper understanding of its genealogy. 
2. On the Nature of Poetic Dwelling 
 Full of merit yet poetically man dwells on this earth 38 So is the saying by 
Hölderlin that Heidegger wants to interrogate. This attempt to be in conversation with 
Hölderlin is not a mere philosophizing through poetry, if philosophizing entails 
bringing the revealing of poetry into concepts as he says There would then be no
moment in which to make a contrived myth out of the figure of the poet. There would 
then be no occasion to misuse his poetry as a rich source for a philosophy 39 Instead, if 
philosophy thinks, it must think poetically. It must not be enchanted by poetry but 
instead learn to think soberly into what poetry says and learn to hear what was
previously unspoken.40 Yet what is the essence of poetry? 
 Ever since Socrates in Plato s Republic declared poetry as neither containing 
knowledge nor the mastery of truth the philosophical understanding of poetry has
not entirely lost this connotation. Poets have more of an accidental relationship to truth 
 
38 Heidegger Poetically Man Dwells Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 214.  
39 Heidegger What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 93. 
40 Ibid. 
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than an essential relation Poetry is either rejected as a frivolous mooning and
vaporizing into the unknown, and a flight into dreamland, or is counted as a part of 
literature poetry cannot appear otherwise than as literature 41 Whereas Plato s
Socrates thought poetry was an unsatisfactory imitation of the world, Aristotle was more 
sympathetic as he thought that poetry, as independent outside of philosophy, is 
worthwhile insofar as it corresponds to the philosopher s real conception of the
world. Nonetheless, both thought that philosophy with its metaphysics and concepts 
had a more original relationship to the truth than the poets. The poets poetized 
vicariously yet inadequately through philosophy s true concept of the world But for
Heidegger, poetry is not a mere musing or imagination. Nor is its value to be assessed 
in terms of how much it corresponds to the real world defined by metaphysical
concepts. Furthermore, poetic thinking is not an ornamentation that fulfills the 
limited worldview of metaphysical thinking; its nature and disposition are 
fundamentally different. No matter how sophisticated our techn  [craft and knowledge] 
and our art is it does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and
hover over it. Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, 
and thus brings him into dwelling 42 Poetry is an undertaking in humility. It is waiting, 
listening, and pondering by being situated in an earthly existence. 
 
41 Heidegger Poetically Man Dwells Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 211-2. 
42 Ibid., p. 216. 
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 In the phrase poetically man dwells Heidegger says that poetry first causes
dwelling to be dwelling Poetry is what really lets us dwell 43 In dealing with beings, 
poetry lets beings be and preserves and pays heed to the nature of beings 44 The 
creation of poetry is a kind of building of a saving place that preserves the essence of 
human existence.45 It is an act of freedom, a letting of language to hold sway over the 
poet, so the poet can utter the holy. It is a standing in the clearing of being where the 
poet is able access the depths of their human their mortal essence The more poetic a
poet is the freer (that is, the more open and ready for the unforeseen) his saying the 
greater is the purity with which he submits what he says to an ever more painstaking 
listening 46 The poets cannot indulge with themselves; they have to dwell on the 
clearing of being and their thrownness in language The thinking of being protects the
word, and in such protectiveness fulfills its vocation. It is a care for our use of language. 
The thinker says being The poet names the holy 47 Poetizing is a care for the use of
language and it is an act of proclaiming what is sacred about the word It is a respect
for the proclaimed and a thanking that looks outwards by projecting itself out from the 
mere subjectivity of the poet. The poet does not proclaim the holy in order to subjugate 
and gain mastery of the holy the way a colonizer declares dominance over a land by 
 
43 Ibid., p. 213. 
44 See my discussion about letting beings be in Chapter 3. 
45 Heidegger Poetically Man Dwells Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 213. 
46 Ibid., p. 214. 
47 Heidegger Postscript to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, p. 237. 
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naming it. The poets nurse and nurture in the essential realm of holy; they listen. Thus, 
in poetizing, the poet names the holy.48 But isn t this poet just a secular version of the
religious prophet who claims to have heard the holy word of God, or of divinity? Is the 
poet a secular prophet? This is more likely than not, because Heidegger himself had a 
religious upbringing and had also demanded a religious funeral. Perhaps we can use 
the word prophet interchangeably with poet as long as the notion of prophet does
not involve any sort of commanding or ordering.  
This naming does not consist merely in something already known being 
supplied with a name; it is rather that when the poet speaks the essential word, the 
existent is by this naming nominated as what it is. So, it becomes known as existent 49 
The poet does not name what was already present but in naming it, it presences into 
existence. The poetic creation has an intimate relationship to the void, a non-place, a 
non-existence. It is not a representation of what was already there but an act of creating 
meaning out of non-meaning. It is a venturing into the unfamiliar daimon that is not 
yet present in poetic language. But in this venturing in language also lies the danger 
and Heidegger says it is language which first creates the manifest conditions for
 
48 A similar idea of poetry was also pronounced by Percy Bysshe Shelly Poets are the hierophants of an
unapprehended inspiration, the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present, 
the words which express what they understand not Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the World
(in The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Vol. III, Harry Buxton Forman (ed.) [London: Reeves and 
Turner, 1880], p. 144, emphasis added). 
49 Martin Heidegger Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry in Existence and Being, (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1949), p. 304. 
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menace and confusion to existence, and thus the possibility of the loss of existence, that 
is to say danger 50 As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the danger is also 
where there lies the saving power; we cannot be saved if the thinkers and the poets are 
complacent and do not dare to venture into danger, into the confusion of existence, with 
rigor and care.   
Language is the condition for the art of poetry that lets things reveal themselves. 
So long as the language of poetry deals with the apophantic as of assertion rather than 
the hermeneutic as of understanding there are bound to be confusions about existence
and our place in the world, thus bringing the danger close to us. Language is not simply 
a stock of words and syntactical rules but a conversation where beings speak and 
hear from one another.51 If the question being is pondered only propositionally, the real 
essence of Dasein remains in the dark. But Heidegger thinks that in the hermeneutic way 
of relating to the world, there is no confusion or repudiation; as he said that the conflict 
between essential thinkers is the lovers quarrel 52 A conversation between thinkers 
will always be a conversation of the same thing, if such conversation is possible. 
Hölderlin s poetic text which ends with the phrase on this earth is not
superfluous because our dwelling already means man s stay on earth on this
 
50 Heidegger Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry p 298  
51 Ibid., p. 301. 
52 Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 256. I discuss this at the end of Chapter 3 in relation to 
Heraclitus fragments. 
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earth and not anywhere else 53 Being on the earth does not simply mean material 
existence. It is not simply a totality of substances and mechanisms. Earth is our 
primordial grounding and a place where beings like us emerge. Having an earthly 
existence does not simply mean existing as a mere substantia or extension (a material 
entity with extended properties) as in Cartesian metaphysics. It is existing within the 
surplus of meanings and entities, and being close to our dwelling, a place that preserves 
and protects us. But one could ask: if the earth is truly our dwelling that preserves and 
protects, why are there hurricanes, droughts, and other natural disasters that ruthlessly 
take the lives of countless beings every day? The same version of this question comes 
up in the religious dilemma of the benevolent God. The answer to this question has 
serious repercussions for Heidegger s thinking and is a challenge to Heidegger s
criticism of metaphysics. It becomes quite a relevant question: how can nature be 
anything other than a mechanism? Just as God is no longer relevant in the present 
humanism, neither God nor nature is sacred or holy.54 By declaring nature to be a sacred 
ground of dwelling, is Heidegger artificially creating a version of nature that is contrary 
its true version which is a neutral valueless mechanism Aren t we the ones who
bring values to the valueless nature perhaps because of our proclivity to create 
values where there are none? What about someone like the popularizer of scientific 
 
53 Heidegger Poetically Man Dwells Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 215. 
54 Cf Heidegger s discussion in The Word of Nietzsche God Is Dead in Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, pp. 53-112. 
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thinking Carl Sagan who championed space exploration with a conviction that We
began as wanderers and we are wanderers still 55 What about Nietzsche s observation 
in Human, All Too Human that He who has attained to only some degree of freedom of
mind cannot feel other than a wanderer on the earth though not as a traveler to a final 
destination: for this destination does not exist. But he will watch and observe and keep 
his eyes open to see what is really going on in the world; for this reason he may not let 
his heart adhere too firmly to any individual thing; within him too there must be 
something wander ing that takes pleasure in change and transience 56 We now know 
through science that in a few billion years Earth is going to be swallowed up by our 
expanding sun and every life on earth will evaporate. And eventually everything that 
ever was will be gone with a bang or a whimper. What are we to make of such 
knowledge? Sagan believes that this gives us a reason to say that we are wanderers 
because eventually we have to leave the earth to survive. But this also equally gives us a 
reason to believe that we are dwellers, settlers, because if we need to wander to survive, 
we need to settle to be to rest and contemplate our own existence. Heidegger might 
respond to this by saying that Dasein is ultimately situated in time and completely 
detached from the objective knowledge of the universe offered by science. But is this 
not a myopic thinking of Heidegger that cannot inquire beyond lived experience? 
 
55 Carl Sagan, Cosmos (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 193. 
56 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) § 638, p. 203.  
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Maybe. But insofar as we experience the earth phenomenologically, we will never 
experience it in a timeless objective realm. No matter what its fate is in objective time, 
we will only be acquainted with it within our horizon in time and place. 
Heidegger s notion of Nature that echoes the meaning of the Greek word
physis that which arises is a more adequate way of understanding his talk about 
the earth.57 The earth as Nature is life a place where beings emerge and not simply a
ball of rock floating around the sun Heidegger says that Nature means the Being of
beings and a will that gathers every ens entity into itself 58 It is where things come 
together and entities come to life. Nature as Being lets beings loose into the daring
venture Being is the venture pure and simple It ventures us us humans It ventures
the living beings 59 It is this essential ground of Being that has the originary source of 
the meaning of existence; it is a ground for a poetic creation. It is no surprise so many of 
the poets seem to turn to nature in order to be ventured by it, and thus inspire the 
revealing of poetry. Heidegger says that it is in this way that mortals nurse and
nurture the things that grow and specially construct things that do not grow 60 This 
nursing and nurturing is an essential relationship that ties us to our progenitors more 
originally than any kind of logos apophantikos or rationality. Loving and caring become 
 
57 Heidegger What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 98. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., p. 99. 
60 Heidegger Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 149. 
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more primary than logic and concepts. We also engage ourselves in art, a special mode 
of techne, to reveal and create things that do not grow in nature. But metaphysical 
thinking has long privileged thoughts that grow out of the products of the techne than 
those that grow out of physis; it favors a hydroelectric plant as achieved by technology 
more than the Rhine river as shown by nature. 
Heidegger says that Hölderlin in the act of establishing the essence of poetry, 
first determines a new time. It is the time of the gods that have fled and of the god that is 
coming 61 The godheads that had gathered beings to a dwelling had fled and had torn 
apart the beings into destitution The default of God means that no god any longer 
gathers men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocally, and by such gathering 
disposes the world s history and man s sojourn in it 62 What is the appropriate 
response to this destitution? Reviving a belief in God, worshipping God, or practicing 
religion? Maybe. But the problem with this destitution is not really the irrelevance of 
God in the present secular age; it is the lack of a dwelling that was at first protected by 
the gods. Whereas the gods of the religions are protected by the authority of the 
religious institutions, the new gods that are yet to come, are protected by the careful 
naming of the poet To be a poet in a destitute time means to attend singing to the
trace of the fugitive gods. This is why the poet in the time of the world's night utters the 
 
61 Heidegger Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry in Existence and Being, p. 313. 
62 Heidegger What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 89.  
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holy. This is why, in Hölderlin s language the world s night is the holy night 63 In 
venturing out into the unfamiliar night of the holy, the poets bring a way to be close to 
our ethos and circle us back to our originary character of existence. The poets leave us 
with a diagnosis of our dwelling that is uttered by the thinkers as to honestly say: 
However hard and bitter, however hampering and threatening the lack of houses 
remains, the real plight of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses. The real 
plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars with their destruction, 
older also than the increase of the earth s population and the condition of the 
industrial workers. The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search 
anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell.64
 
63 Ibid., p. 92. 
64 Heidegger Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 159. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Here we arrive at the question that I presented at the outset: what is thinking? 
Are we able to answer it yet? Somewhat. Even though we cannot see the full extent of 
what thinking means, Heidegger prepares us to understand what that would mean. By 
now it is quite clear that thinking is not about having an opinion or representing the 
state of affairs through predetermined concepts, because these conform to the model of 
truth as correctness, which purports to correspond to reality. Thinking is not mere 
truth-telling, if truth exists only in the distinction of true and false.  Thinking is not 
about deriving the meaning of our involvement with the world only through assertion 
and premises. It is not about thematizing the world into a determinate objective 
existence; it is not about making the world as picture  It is not about denying 
mysteries and uncertainties. It is not about finding efficiency and control of objects and 
phenomena. It is not about absolute certainty. It is not about collecting facts and 
keeping them at our disposal. It is not about governing and dictating all the ends 
suitable to an inert nature It is not a lordship It is not an act of detached observation  
It is not a counting or estimating. It is not a demanding and challenging-forth. It is not a 
building of things as standing-reserve, ready for use. It is not an erring and a forgetting 
of the past. It is not what alienates and uproots us. Now that we have exhausted the list 
of what thinking is not, we are more prepared to see what thinking is. 
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Thinking is about having an openness to the mysteries of meaning and ways of 
understanding our place. It is a dwelling that lets thought be without an imposition of 
grid-like structures. It is about poetizing and venturing into the danger of non-meaning 
in order to understand Being. It is about truth-telling, if truth exists as emergence from 
hiddenness. It is about letting beings be in finite truths without any grand goal of 
unlocking infinite and absolute knowledge. It is about deriving meaning about our 
place in the world through Dasein s hermeneutic involvement with things. It is about 
finding our telos. It is about releasement a suspending of willing and the desire for 
control. It is about letting nature be meaningful. It is being a shepherd. It is an act of 
engaged practice. It is a meditating, waiting, and pondering. It is a building of a 
dwelling that merits reverence and piety. It is hearing the voice of being. It is a caution 
from erring. It is a humility about our finitude of knowledge. It is what grounds us and 
gives us a sense of being at home. It is a dwelling, if not a sojourn, in aporia. It is a 
questioning. Yet in calling all these things thinking are we not calling thinking
nothing at all? Maybe. But at the very least, for Heidegger, all of these are the 
preparatory elements of thinking before essential thinking occurs. Perhaps this is the 
best that we in our time can hope for. 
Heidegger once made a curious remark: In this dawning atomic age a far
greater danger threatens precisely when the danger of a third world war has been 
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removed 1 What could be a greater danger than a third world war? Global pandemic? 
Climate change? Meteorites? Killer robots? All of them threaten the same kind of 
annihilation of life, if not merely of the human race. And it is a strange assertion for 
Heidegger to make, thought-provoking at its best and ostentatious nonsense at its 
worst, that death is not even the worst thing. The worst thing for Heidegger is when 
calculation is believed to be the only way of thinking. But how is there going to be any 
thinking if there are no beings left to think? Perhaps Heidegger would not have 
hesitated to say: if there are no beings left to think, it is mostly likely that those beings 
did not think. Certainly, a curious assertion. It is perhaps opportune to recall Nietzsche: 
Our highest insights must and should sound like follies and sometimes like crimes 
when they are heard without permission by those who are not predisposed and 
predestined for them. 2
 
1 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. by John M. Anderson and Hans Freund (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1966), p. 50. 
2 Nietzsche, Beyond Good & Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, §30, p. 42.  
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